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ETHIOPIA AND SUDAN ONE YEAR LATER: REFUGEE AND FAMINE RECOVERY NEEDS

A MINORITY STAFF REPORT

PREPARED FOR THE USE OF THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE POLICY

TO THE

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY UNITED STATES SENATE

MAY 1986

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LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

U.S. SENATE,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE POLICY,
Washington, DC, July 2, 1986.

Hon. STROM THURMOND,
Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary,
U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: Enclosed is a report prepared by Senator Kennedy's staff, "Ethiopia and Sudan One Year Later: Refugee and Famine Recovery Needs."

The report details findings of the minority staff from a study trip made this spring to followup on the refugee and famine problems addressed in a subcommittee hearing during the first session of this Congress.

Senator Kennedy has requested that this minority staff report be printed as a Committee Print.

Thank you for your consideration of this request.

Most sincerely,

ALAN K. SIMPSON,
Chairman, Subcommittee on
Immigration & Refugee Policy.

FOREWORD

The Subcommittee on Immigration and Refugee Policy has engaged in a review of the relief efforts in Ethiopia and Sudan. In conjunction with that review, Senator Kennedy requested, with the concurrence of Senator Simpson, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Immigration and Refugee Policy, that a field investigation by minority staff be conducted in these countries. Senator Kennedy's findings prepared as a result of this field investigation are recorded in this report. At the request of Senator Kennedy, I have authorized this material to be printed so that the first-hand impressions of this review may be made available to others.

STROM THURMOND,
Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary.

PREFACE

This report follows a 2-week field visit to Ethiopia and Sudan undertaken at the request of Senator Kennedy to review the continuing relief and recovery needs of refugees and drought victims, as well as to assess the progress of the international program of assistance. This was done to up-date Senator Kennedy's original report to the subcommittee,* which followed his trip to the field in December 1984. Our itinerary also focused on the same sites as those we visited with Senator Kennedy 1½ years ago.

In addition to our meetings in the field with government, international, and voluntary agency officials, we met with senior officials of both the Ethiopian and Sudan Governments. We held lengthy consultations with American Embassy and A.I.D. personnel as well as officials of the United Nations, the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, the International Committee of the Red Cross, among others, both in the field, Geneva, and in Rome, with officials of the World Food Program and the U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization.

The following report reflects our principal findings and recommendations.

JERRY TINKER,
Minority Counsel.

JOHN WISE,
Special Consultant.

*See "The Famine Effects on African Refugees," Hearing before the Subcommittee on Immigration and Refugee Policy, U.S. Senate, February 7, 1985.

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SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

ETHIOPIA

1. RELIEF HAS SAVED MILLIONS OF LIVES

The news not heard from Ethiopia today is that over the past year the lives of 7 million men, women and children have been saved from starvation. The mass starvation found in Ethiopia in 1984 has ended. Ethiopia has been pulled back from the brink of what threatened to become one of the great human tragedies of modern times.

Today, thanks to the sustained efforts of the international community—and to the incredible work and sacrifice of the international and voluntary agencies—a remarkable success story of international relief has been accomplished in Ethiopia and Sudan. The American people can know that their assistance not only got through to the people in need, but that it made a difference between life and death for millions. A visit to Ethiopia today shows that the extraordinary outpouring of assistance from Americans has helped to transform a drought and famine into a new harvest of hope.

The prospects for this year's rains remain good and most villagers have been able to return to the countryside to plant their crops—thanks to the out-reach food distribution program launched by the international and voluntary agencies over the past year. This last year's food deficit in Ethiopia will still be 900,000 metric tons (down from last year's 1.3 million ton deficit). But the 1987 food and relief needs should be substantially reduced. The pipeline for this year's program is full and the prospects for the coming harvest good.

2. INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE

There are many who deserve credit for the feat of conquering a massive famine threat in Ethiopia. Western governments, led by the United States, responded with generous food and relief. Those on the front-lines—the voluntary, church agencies, and the international organizations—all who helped sound the alarm—deserve special honors. But the Ethiopian Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (RRC) also deserves credit for a professional and competent performance under extraordinarily difficult circumstances. Finally, the United Nations Coordinator, established by the Secretary-General, deserves credit for creating an umbrella under which scores of western (and Soviet block) donors, as well as over 40 voluntary and international agencies in the field, and the Ethiopian RRC, could all coordinate and work as smoothly as possible under such emergency and difficult circumstances. The inevitable chaos of the first days of the relief effort have now become one of the more orga-

nized, professional, and coordinated relief programs seen in recent years—thanks to the U.N. Coordinator. This role needs to be continued for at least another year.

3. CURRENT CONDITIONS

Instead of a parched panorama of barren brown, the countryside in Ethiopia today has a light hue of green. Last year's drought has been broken, and ponds, lakes and streams are returning to Ethiopia. There are still significant pockets of need—some caused by drought, as in southwestern Harerge province, others by civil strike, as in central Tigre province. But the over-all picture remains guardedly optimistic for this coming year. There is more food in Ethiopia today than at anytime over the past 3 years—so there is a cushion, a carry-over, and a continued flow of food donations assured through the end of 1986. The question remains on what the needs will be in 1987 and what the U.S. response will be.

4. RESETTLEMENT PROGRAM

The Ethiopian Government has announced it has halted the forced resettlement of Ethiopian villagers from the north to the south until after this harvest season. Although this announcement comes belatedly and only after strong and justified criticism, the forced resettlement program has ended. The timing and implementation of the program in 1984–85—as senior Ethiopian officials now privately admit—was seriously flawed.

The new fact today is that this coercive and chaotic program has been halted, and the United States and other western donors should act to seize this new opportunity to help reverse and ameliorate one of the Ehiopian Government's worst mistakes.

5. SPECIAL PLIGHT OF ORPHANS

Today there are perhaps 20,000 to 25,000 orphans in Ethiopia—one of the saddest legacies of last year's devastating famine. It represents a social problem of compelling concern—shared by the Ethiopian Government, the voluntary agencies, and western donors. But there are no simple solutions. Nonetheless, far greater emphasis, and considerably greater resources, must be devoted to addressing it than are being done so today.

6. FOOD AS A WEAPON

From the outset, there has been a deep and justified worry that in strife-torn Ethiopia and Sudan food should not be used by any party as a weapon. As outlined in this report, recent incidents in both Ethiopia and Sudan require renewed international efforts to reassert this fundamental principle.

7. BILATERAL RELATIONS WITH ETHIOPIA

Despite the frigid official diplomatic relations that exist between the United States and Marxist Ethiopia, there has been considerable progress in establishing constructive relations at every other level of Ethiopian society. Among the people an extraordinarily pro-American sentiment remains alive in Ethiopia. This, more than

anything else, should give us encouragement to remain there, and we should not close the door opened to us through our contributions to the famine relief effort—which Ethiopians, high and low, thank us for. Yet some voices in Washington today are urging a totally hostile course, frequently encouraged through harsh Congressional resolutions which are sometimes based on questionable information and assertions. Our foreign policy and humanitarian interests in the region deserve better than that.

SUDAN

1. CONTINUING REFUGEE NEEDS

Sudan continues to host the largest number of refugees of any country in Africa. Over one million refugees from nearly every neighboring country have sought food, relief, and peace in Sudan over the past several years. But last year, few Ethiopians arriving in the east found it, and many perished for the lack of food and basic relief supplies. And in southern Sudan a rapidly deteriorating security situation over the past few months is now jeopardizing the movement of food and relief. Refugee relief needs remain great in Sudan, although the overall domestic food situation has improved.

Today there are approximately 405,000 Ethiopian refugees in eastern Sudan who are in camps, or receiving food and maintenance assistance from the UNHCR. Another 200,000 to 300,000 earlier Ethiopian refugees are largely self-sufficient and integrated in towns or villages. In the south 250,000 from Uganda and 5,000 from Zaire are claimed by Sudanese authorities to be receiving assistance. And, finally, in the west, some 100,000 refugees from Chad are encamped along the border.

But while a year ago over 7,000 new refugees were arriving every day in eastern Sudan—a human tide that completely overwhelmed the preparations of the Sudan government and the UNHCR as well—today thousands of Ethiopians are voluntarily returning home. And in the other regions the numbers have stabilized for the better, even if needs and conditions have not.

Although the UNHCR has finally taken steps to cope with the Ethiopian refugee crisis—which is in sharp contrast from the utter chaos and failure of their program a year ago—serious relief needs obviously remain. The United States contributed well over two-thirds of the food needs in Sudan last year, but that will be sharply reduced this coming year. Hopefully, the United States can return to supporting our traditionally one-third of the UNHCR program.

2. FOOD NEEDS IN SUDAN

A year ago Sudan stood on the brink of becoming another Ethiopia, as the same drought withered crops across Sudan and thousands began to flee toward urban areas in search of food. But a major international relief effort was launched in time to get food into the countryside, and certain disaster was avoided. Villagers were able to stay on their lands and when last year's rains came much of Sudan was able to produce a bumper crop. In fact, it produced a 1 million ton surplus in 1985. However, that surplus was in the east and the areas of need were in the central and western re-

gions. Because of logistical and transport problems, too little of this surplus food was moved and serious food and relief needs persisted in Sudan even though its total harvest was better than normal.

There will be residual food needs in Sudan (beyond the needs of the refugees) even if the harvest is adequate again this year. The Food and Agricultural Organization has predicted that 300,000 tons of food will be needed and that an additional 525,000 tons must be purchased locally to meet food needs in the deficit regions of Kordofan and Darfur, the Red Sea area, and the southern provinces. AID suggests the total figure will be 400,000 tons, which should also be available from local sources.

3. FUTURE PROSPECTS

Like Ethiopia, Sudan remains an impoverished nation of subsistence farmers battling the continuing march southward of the Sahara desert. It faces serious long-term agricultural and ecological problems, but its short-term food prospects—particularly in the largely irrigated eastern region—seem favorable this year. Because of the continuing needs of the refugees, plus pockets of food shortages among the Sudanese themselves, they will require additional food assistance next year.

The critical issue currently facing Sudan is a political one: the assumption to power of a new leader based upon the recent elections, and the new government's ability to cope with the mounting economic and security problems confronting the country. Sudan prides itself on being the largest country in Africa: today its problems equal its size.

REFUGEE AND FAMINE RECOVERY NEEDS IN ETHIOPIA AND SUDAN

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

ETHIOPIA TODAY

The news today from Ethiopia is that over the past year the lives of over 7 million men, women and children have been saved from starvation.

While serious relief needs persist in many areas—and long-term recovery and development programs have yet to really begin—Ethiopia today has been pulled back from the brink of what, just a year and a half ago, threatened to become one of the great human tragedies of modern times.

Drought and famine had imperiled the lives of over 9 million people. Hundreds of thousands were huddled in open-air camps or hastily built shelters and tents around scores of provincial cities and towns. Whole villages were fleeing the barren countryside in a desperate search for food and relief. Some 8 million Ethiopians were considered "at risk," and food, medicines and other essential relief supplies were either not available or completely inadequate.

At the time, the drought in Ethiopia and Sudan was the worst these areas had experienced in this century.[1] The rains began to fail 2 years earlier, and there was essentially no rainfall in 1984. Although soil erosion, over-grazing, deforestation and poor agricultural practices contributed to the creation of desert conditions in the once fertile areas of northern Ethiopia, there was no question that severe drought was the source of the tragedy. In 1984 rural Ethiopia simply has no reserves of food to fall back on.

Today, thanks to the sustained efforts of the international community, led by the United States and other western donors—and to the incredible work and sacrifice of the international and voluntary agencies—one of the decade's more remarkable success stories in international relief has been accomplished in Ethiopia.

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[1] The first recorded famine in Ethiopia reportedly dates from the ninth century. From 1540 through 1742 there were more than 10 major famines of record. What has been called the "great Ethiopian famine" occurred between 1888-1892—killing what some estimate to be fully one third of the population.

The last famine was in 1973-1974, but was far less severe or widespread as the drought in 1983-1984—although it was the final straw that brought down the feeble government of the ailing Emperor Haile Selassie. As estimated 100,000 or more died.

TABLE I.—EXAMPLES OF FAMINE IN MODERN HISTORY

[Prepared by the Congressional Research Service]

Country	Year	Population
China	1958–62	Up to 30 million [1]
Kampuchea	1975–79	2 million [2]
Nigeria and Biafra	1967–70	2 million [3]
Sahel (West Africa)	1968–73	100,000 [4]
Bangladesh	1974	1 million [5]
Ethiopia	1974	100,000 plus [6]
Somalia	1978–80	NA [7]
Africa	1984–85	Over 1 million [8]

[1] There has been a range of estimates between 10 and 30 million of the famine death toll during this period in China. The 30 million figure has gained wider acceptance among experts. It has been cited by Judith Bannister of the U.S. Census Bureau.

[2] Figure provided by Carl C. Mabbs-Zeno, U.S. Dept. of Agriculture.

[3] This is a UNICEF estimate cited in Schwab, Peter. Biafra. New York, Facts on File, 1971. p. 91. Another source gives a total of 2 million deaths in Biafra from both fighting and malnutrition. Nelson, Harold D. and others. Area Handbook for Nigeria. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1972. p. 236.

[4] This estimate, given in a public statement by UN Secretary General Waldheim, has been traced to an academic study which gave the figure as an "absolute, and most improbable, upper limit." Simon, Julian. Resources, Population, Environment: An Oversupply of False Bad News. Science, v. 208, June 27, 1980. Other estimates range from tens of thousands to one million.

[5] Figure provided by Carl C. Mabbs-Zeno, U.S. Dept. of Agriculture.

[6] Ethiopia acknowledged 100,000 deaths in one province, but said figures from other affected regions were unavailable. Facts on File, 1974. p. 529.

[7] High rates of child morbidity due to malnutrition were reported among Somali refugees who had fled Ethiopia. Nelson, Harold D. and others. Somalia: A Country Study. Area Handbook for Somalia. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1982. p. 126.

[8] United Nations, Economic Commission for Africa. Second Special Memorandum by the ECA Conference of Ministers: International Action for Relaunching the Initiative for Long-Term Development and Economic Growth in Africa. UN Document E/ECA/CM.11/77/Rev. 1. Addis Ababa, May 1985. p. 5. The African famine continued for some months after this April 1985 estimate was published, but no subsequent overall estimate of deaths has been located. Indeed, it is worth noting that international and U.S. agencies, as well as independent analysts, seem reluctant to make such estimates.

Although the Marxist leadership of Ethiopia made the task difficult, and United States-Ethiopian relations remain strained and at times unnecessarily hostile, the essential work of the relief agencies or of Americans working in the field was not impeded. The government's Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (RRC) has generally received high praise for its competence and professionalism, and there has developed a close working relationship between it and the western donors.

The result was that at the peak of the relief effort last year, the donor nations in league with the RRC—and with the help of over 40 voluntary and international agencies—fed and assisted over 7.1 million people throughout Ethiopia. Over 1.2 million metric tons of food was shipped, off-loaded, trucked, or air-dropped to hundreds of shelters and feeding centers around the country.

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[2] This figure is, obviously, an estimate. But it is based upon the observations, rough statistics, and general impressions of those working in the field and was cited by several, widely divergent sources. It includes both the mortality estimates inside Ethiopia, as well as those in the camps along the Ethiopian border of Sudan.

Given the fact that 8 to 9 million people were considered "at risk" in Ethiopia in late 1984, and that the full reach of the relief operation only extended to a maximum of 7.1 million a full 8 months later, this difference of some 1 million is often cited as a basis for estimating the numbers who fell outside the relief net. Also included are the high death rates in the Sudan camps, such as Wad Kowli—in early 1985, and other areas of Sudan.

However, no one will ever know the scope of the tragedy of the famine in Ethiopia. As in earlier famines, the deadly hand of starvation is a silent one, with uncounted numbers perishing in rural areas, their cries for help unheard and their deaths unseen by an outside world.

The task was, of course, enormous, and perhaps as many as a million people are estimated to have perished [2] before the operation reached all those in need as well as the refugees in Sudan. While there were all the logistical and bureaucratic obstacles involved in any major relief operation, particularly one in rural Africa, the Ethiopian relief effort has been a major success story for which the American people, as the leading donor, can be proud.

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

MAP COURTESY LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, FAND.

Nowhere is the contrast (and the progress) more apparent in Ethiopia today than in a return visit to Makelle, the capital of Tigre province. In December 1984 well over 70,000 famine victims had encamped around the town, where most of them shivered around small campfires in the bitter cold, with no shelter, with little food on hand, and even less medicines or other relief supplies. Thousands of new families were arriving every day. By May, 1985 the number of these famine refugees had swelled to over 175,000, nearly outnumbering the resident population. Tents and other temporary shelters were ultimately provided, but conditions were harsh and the death rates high—some 50 people in this area every day. The scene was bleak and the prospects seemed even dimmer.

The ultimate strategy for coping with this crisis was to launch an intensive feeding program to save the most vulnerable—the children under five—and the establishment of an emergency feeding program for the rest until they were strong enough to return to their villages. The ultimate goal would then be to assist those families in returning to their lands with sufficient food, seeds and other supplies to allow them to plant for the next harvest. If rural Ethiopians (as in Sudan and other drought-affected areas of Africa) were not able to obtain food in the rural areas, they would necessarily come to crowded, unhealthy shelters around the major cities and towns, abandoning the countryside and destroying any hope for the next harvest.

Thanks to contributions of the international community—to the work of the international and voluntary agencies—and the resources and commitment of the Ethiopian Relief and Rehabilitation Commission, this strategy worked. Over the past year all the shelters in Makelle were closed in an orderly fashion and the villagers given the necessary rations and seeds to return to their villages to try and begin anew. Today a monthly ration system reaches out into the countryside to replace the daily feeding programs of the year before, and the need for the special infant feeding programs (except in isolated cases) has ended. A degree of normalcy has returned to Makelle and other areas in Ethiopia, and a new harvest of hope exists in the countryside.

This was made possible by the lifeline of food and other relief the United States and other western donors offered to the people of Ethiopia over the past year; (see accompanying tables and those in the appendix). It was a lifeline that has been both acknowledged and appreciated by Ethiopians and by their leaders at the highest levels.[3] It has given millions an opportunity to survive a disastrous drought and to start anew. It has also become a challenge to their government to improve their lot and to deal more effectively with the developmental and agricultural policy reforms that contribute to Ethiopia's annual food deficits.

The message from Makelle, and from other areas of Ethiopia, is that a major human catastrophe was avoided over the past year. In the end, the American people should know that their assistance got

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[3] For many months in 1984–85, the Ethiopian leadership attempted to downplay, if not ignore, the United States' role in the famine relief effort. That is no longer the case. As the Foreign Minister, Mr. Goshu Wolde, expressed, "The Ethiopian people deeply appreciate the assistance offered by the American people." A similar statement was made by Mr. Berhanu Bayih, Minister of Labor and Social Affairs (and no. 5 in the ruling Politburo).

through to people in need. Our aid made a difference—a difference between life and death for millions.

TABLE II.—STATISTICS ON THE ETHIOPIAN FAMINE—1985–86

	1985	1986
Population	42 million	42.5 million.
Population "at risk".	7.9 million	5.8 million.
Food needs	1.3 million metric tons (Dec. 1, 1984–Dec. 31, 1985).	900,000 metric tons (Jan. 1, 1986–Dec. 31, 1986).
Food pledges	1.233 million metric tons committed by donors	824,000 metric tons committed by donors.
	Sources:	Sources:
	U.S.: 444,000 MT (36.0 percent)	U.S.: 300,000 MT (36.4 percent).
	EEC: 198,000 MT (16.1 percent)	EEC: 160,000 MT (19.4 percent).
	Canada: 167,000 MT (13.5 percent)	Canada: 85,000 MT (10.3 percent).
	All Others: 424,000 MT (34.4 percent)	All Others: 279,400 MT (33.9 percent).
Food delivered	December 1984–December 1985: 1,177,000 metric tons:	Since January 1, 1986: 159,837 metric tons;
	Average of 90,500; metric tons per month	Average of 80,000; metric tons per month;
	Port offtake averaged 78,300 metric tons per month	Port offtake averaged 48,000 metric tons per month;
	Average distributed 62,200 metric tons per month	Average distributed 62,500 metric tons per month;
Summary	Dec. 1, 1844–Dec. 31, 1985:	Jan. 1, 1986–Dec. 31, 1986:
	Food Arrivals, 1,177,000 metric tons	1985 carryover, 306,000 metric tons;
	Still in ports; 159,000 metric tons	Food arrivals, 160,000 metric tons;
	Still in warehouses, 147,000 metric tons	Still in ports, 190,000 metric tons;
	Actually distributed, 809,000	Still in warehouses, 151,000 metric tons;
		Actually distributed; 125,000 metric tons.

TABLE III.—DISTRIBUTION STATISTICS (DEC. 1, 1984–DEC. 31, 1985)

Month	Metric tons of food distributed	Beneficiaries reached	Percent of 7.9 million at risk
December	44,500	2,970,000	37.6
January	46,500	3,100,000	39.2
February	49,000	3,250,000	41.1
March	51,000	3,400,000	43.3
April	52,000	3,470,000	43.9
May	70,000	4,941,000	62.5
June	66,700	5,211,000	66.0
July	68,400	5,802,000	73.4
August	77,400	6,488,000	82.1
September	80,100	7,120,000	90.1
October	65,700	6,012,000	76.1
November	69,200	6,007,000	76.0
December	68,700	6,203,000	78.5

Note: Up until May, the RRC used a 15-kg ration in calculating beneficiaries. In June, however, a ration of 9.5 kg was used by the RRC to calculate beneficiaries in Eritrea and Tigre. In July, the RRC adopted 11 kg as a general ration level. The average ration per person works out at 416 grams per day.

TABLE IV.—EMERGENCY FOOD PLEDGES TO ETHIOPIA

[In metric tons]

Country	1985	1986
Australia	38,381	17,600
Austria	8,837	4,000
Belgium	15,057	.....
Bulgaria	18,012	.....
Canada	166,568	85,000
China	15,500	.....

TABLE IV.—EMERGENCY FOOD PLEDGES TO ETHIOPIA—Continued

[In metric tons]

Country	1985	1986
Czechoslovakia	391	.....
Denmark	2,099	.....
E.E.C	198,026	160,000
Finland	4,940	.....
France	10,368	8,000
German D.R	2,060	.....
Germany F.R	60,801	30,000
Greece	10,040	2,500
Hungary	2,484	.....
ICRC	8,091	.....
Iceland	64	.....
India	57,000	.....
Iran	5,158	.....
Ireland	1,943	.....
Israel	204	.....
Italy	9,352	.....
Japan	10,030	.....
Libya	1,000	.....
Netherlands	5,562	2,000
New Zealand	140	.....
Norway	10,000	.....
OXFAM (UK)	7,823	.....
OXFAM (U.S.)	6,767	.....
Pakistan	1,000	.....
Poland	1,986	.....
Spain	5,194	.....
Sri Lanka	20	.....
Sweden	14,162	8,700
Switzerland	2,196	2,000
UAE	1,825	.....
United States	443,985	300,000
United Kingdom	57,493	13,700
WFP	22,423	52,000
Yugoslavia	5,771	.....
Privately raised:		
Canadian Food Bank		25,000
LWF		10,500
LRC		1,100
CARITAS		30,000
Band Aid		1,500
Mennonites		1,300
Redd Barna		3,500
SIM		1,000
CRDA		15,000
ECS		50,000
Total	1,232,753	824,400

Source: A.I.D. Addis Ababa.

The best evidence of the progress that has been achieved is that the confusion and chaos of the early days of the relief effort has now given way to one of the more organized, professional, relief programs seen in recent years. For this major credit must go to the Office of United Nations Coordinator in Addis Ababa who, working under the authorities that that Secretary-General gave to the Office of Emergency Operations for Africa (OEOA) in 1984, has been able to successfully coordinate the many diverse elements of the relief effort. Under his umbrella the many diverse agencies working in the field, and the scores of donor governments (both

East and West), as well as the Ethiopian RRC and other international agencies, have all been able to build a professional working relationship that is both effective and well coordinated. Indeed, one of the lessons of the Ethiopian crisis is that there is an important role for U.N. coordinators to play in relief operations such as those in Ethiopia and Sudan (and before that in Bangladesh in 1971–72).

The problems and hurdles at the outset of the relief effort were typical. There was the usual array of logistical, transportation and port bottlenecks. At times there was a totally inadequate response from Ethiopian authorities. and for all involved there are memories of problems with trucks, the availability of seeds, congestion at the ports and, everywhere, logistical problems and frustrations.

Yet, while all these problems were encountered over the past year (and there is a need for continued vigilance against them) the fact remains that last year over 1.2 million metric tons of food was sent, delivered and fed to millions of needy people in Ethiopia. In addition, millions of dollars of nonfood aid was delivered at the same time. This represents a major logistical and organizational achievement for which the United Nations, and the major donor governments, can be justly proud.

To turn around the threat of one of this century's worst famines within a year is an achievement worthy of greater recognition than it has received. Over 7 million lives were saved. That is an extraordinary statement.

Longer-term prospects for Ethiopia obviously remain problematic. It sitll remains the poorest of the major nations of Africa. But thanks to the response of the international community, millions of its people were given a new lease on life—to recover from the drought and famine of 1984–85 and better able to face the agricultural reforms and development issues that all African countries confront today, but particularly Ethiopia.

CURRENT CONDITIONS

A returning observer flying into Ethiopia can see from the air the first hopeful signs of improvement: instead of a parched panorama of barren brown, the countryside now has a light shade of green. Ponds, lakes and streams have returned to Ethiopia. And last year's lunar landscape, where hardly a blade of grass was growing, has come back to life. Clearly, the disastrous drought of 1983 through 1984 has been broken. And with the return of the short rains this past month there is guarded hope that the crucial summer rains will come once again.

With the improved harvest of last year, and the steady arrival of outside food supplies, officials in Addis Ababa indicate that there is more food grain in Ethiopia today than at any time over the past 3 years. As table II and the statistics in the appendices outline, this is the result of previous food pledges, the carry-over of arriving food from last year, and the anticipated harvest in the coming months.

In short, the drought and famine conditions of 1984 are mercifully behind Ethiopia. Except in a few areas—principally in the arid southeast province of Harerge, where drought conditions persists, and parts of Tigre province—Ethiopia is on the road to recovery.

Although the prospects for increased food production are more optimistic in Ethiopia than in several years, many are urging caution until this summer's rains and harvest can be fully assessed. No one in the field disagrees that the international community must be ready to continue transitional food assistance, particularly in the north, if substantial food gaps develop in a number of vulnerable areas. Catholic Relief Services, through its umbrella organization of the Catholic Social Action Committee, has been the most vocal in signalling the need for continued food relief well into 1987. Following the adage that it is best to plan for the worst, but hope for the best, they have pressed their views with the A.I.D. Mission in Addis Ababa that more food will be required than is presently planned. They could well be correct, and it would be prudent not to take any significant organizational or fiscal steps to dismantle our modest A.I.D. Mission in Ethiopia until the food situation is assessed by the end of the year. At a minimum there will be pockets of need as well as short-term rehabilitation and recovery programs that can and should be funded through Public Law 480 food for work programs or other food or disaster assistance funds.

In terms of continued assistance to Ethiopia and other drought-affected countries in Africa, there are some who argue that after any such country has benefitted from a major drought and famine relief operation and goes through 2 years of relatively "normal" cycles of rain and harvest—that country, after the second cycle, does not need relief and rehabilitation assistance, but traditional development assistance. And since Ethiopia is currently barred by legal barriers (and this administration's policy), from receiving any such longer-term development assistance, the A.I.D. Mission in Ethiopia is under instructions to plan to end all assistance by the end of this calendar year.

Yet it can reasonably be argued that Ethiopia has not really experienced 2 years of a theoretically "normal" cycle of agricultural production. The chaos and weakened state of so many of the affected population in 1985 really prevented most from planting, harvesting, or engaging in a normal crop—even though the rains were adequate in many areas. Hence, even if the rains this year are normal or better, this year will represent only the first year of the theoretical two-year cycle. The United States, and other western donors, should be prepared to continue our food outreach program where necessary—although dramatically scaled down from this past year. At a minimum that is what Catholic Relief Services and several other voluntary agencies are urging in Addis Ababa today.

The last thing the American Government should risk is the prospect once again of tens of thousands of villagers fleeing the countryside in search of food and relief because our food outreach programs were ended—creating in the process deadly camps and shelters around provincial towns and cities. Only a program of outreach—of getting food out to the countryside instead of making people come into the towns—can avoid a repeat of the crisis of 1984-85. And that is precisely the structure and the goals of the current voluntary agency programs in northern Ethiopia.

It would be unwise to take steps to dismantle this capability until all officials are satisfied that food assistance in rural areas is adequate to permit villagers to stay on their lands and in their

homes through this, their first real cycle of a two-year production—which will end in the autumn of 1987—not 1986. Again, a "good year" in northern Ethiopia is subsistance farming at best—and that will remain the case until some longer-term agricultural development and capital assistance projects are offered (which clearly are not on the agenda of the U.S. Government at this time).

Unless food conditions change dramatically for the worse, the United States should plan to phase down, but not end, our assistance program in Ethiopia—and we should not end A.I.D.'s presence in Addis Ababa. There are needed and worthy rehabilitation and recovery projects that have been considered by American voluntary agencies—such as food-for-work programs in reforestation and small-scale water resource development projects. But they have not been submitted because they believe A.I.D. cannot fund them, and that the U.S. program will end in December, 1986. However, there is nothing in the statute, nor in the legislative history behind the authorizations and appropriations that have been used for Ethiopian relief programs, which in any way prohibit or limit the funding of such recovery projects. The voluntary agencies, particularly those with an established record in Ethiopia (such as Catholic Relief Services, CARE, World Vision, Save the Children, and others), should be encouraged to submit proposals for famine recovery projects for the 1987 fiscal year, and A.I.D. should favorably consider them.

PLIGHT OF ORPHANS

In 1984, as the devastating affects of the famine became known and as the death rates climbed, a terrible realization dawned that one of the most tragic legacies of the drought might be the creation of thousands of orphans—children whose parents perished, who were abandoned, or became lost in the chaos of the flight from the countryside.

Today that legacy is painfully clear. There are now over 20,000 to 25,000 famine orphans or abandoned children in Ethiopia under 16 years of age. Although no one knows the exact number, the bulk of those included in this estimate were registered by RRC workers last year after both parents were known to have died.

Senior Ethiopian officials are deeply troubled over this festering social problem, and over what they can do to deal with it. In Makelle, for example, there are 1,853 orphans housed in a large shelter (warehoused, unfortunately, would be a more accurate description). Although they are all well fed, they are simply languishing until someone figures out what to do with them. There are no organized programs or activities, much less educational programs. They simply live in a communal shelter where life is punctuated by three meals a day.

The government has now launched a major effort to try to identify any possible living relatives and to see if through some government assistance the extended family (aunts, uncles, grandparents) can be found to care for many of these children. Foster homes are also being pursued, and several of these exist in the resettlement areas. Several orphanages also exist, but others will clearly be

needed. The special plight of these famine orphans must receive far greater attention and concern than they have to date.

RESETTLEMENT PROGRAM

No program of the Ethiopian Government has been more controversial or more subject to strong criticism that its implementation of a resettlement program during the course of last year's relief operation.

The criticisms were well founded. Clearly, the timing and implementation of this resettlement effort was seriously flawed. Worse still was the undeniable evidence of coercion involved. The United States was correct to soundly condemn the program and to refuse to support it in any fashion.

As the accompanying chart outlines, the Ethiopian Government's resettlement program has involved the movement of nearly 600,000 Ethiopians from famine affected regions in the north (principally Wello province) to the more fertile and underpopulated lands of the southwest. All donor governments, including the United States, have acknowledged that a long-term, well-planned resettlement program, on a voluntary basis, is justified. In fact, it was A.I.D., in the early 1970s under our assistance program to the government of Emperor Haile Selassie, who drafted the original plans and designs for many of the current settlements. And historically there has been movement of Ethiopians from the north to the south.

However, in late 1984 and through the summer of 1985, the Ethiopian leadership rushed to implement and expand these movements without adequate planning and using coercive methods. The result is a festering problem that many Ethiopian officials recognize and seek to resolve, while publicly hiding behind the official line that resettlement is sound in principle. No one has questioned the principle, only its implementation.

In fact, in response to this criticism, some senior government officials have come to describe the movement of people from northern Ethiopia in 1984–85 as not a "resettlement program" at all, but an "evacuation" of people from a famine and ecological disaster zone. That characterization may be true—as any objective view of conditions in Tigre and Wello provinces reveal when compared to the rich agricultural possibilities in the southwest. But this still cannot excuse the forced character of the movement. (However, in Ethiopia the word "voluntary," whether under today's Marxist government or under yesterday's Haile Selassie's regime, obviously has a different meaning than in the West.)

Statistics on the Ethiopian Government's Resettlement Program

I. AREA OF RESETTLEMENT [1]

Region	*Number of persons*
Kaffa	76,640
Illubabor	146,216
Shoa	6,149
Wellega	253,282
Gojjam	101,122

Region	Number of persons
Gonder	6,387
Total	589,796

[1] The RRC further reported that these 589,796 represent 203,971 families, or an average of 2.89 persons per family.

II. AREA OF RESETTLEMENT

Region	Area of origin				
	Wello	Shewa	Tigre	Gondar	Gojjam
Kaffa	47,492	6,514	22,634		
Illubabor	72,226	28,275	45,715		
Shoa (Tadele)		6,149			
Wellega	220,636	11,279	21,367		
Gojjam	29,839	54,858			16,425
Gondar				6,387	
Total	370,193	107,075	89,716	6,387	16,425

Today, two new facts characterize the situation and they should condition our further response.

First, the coercive resettlement program has now been halted. From every indication it will not be resumed—certainly not on the previous scale and, according to senior officials of the Ethiopian Government, only on a drastically reduced, better planned schedule, and based upon truly voluntary participation. Officially Ethiopia is "consolidating" the resettlement program—which is to say there will be no new movements through the summer rains and harvest season ending in December 1986.

Second, the government has acknowledged (obviously without fanfare) that many of the allegations against the program were true. For example, their recent recognition of the problem of split families caused by the resettlement movement acknowledge, by inference that the chaos and coercion that caused the problem of broken families in the first place. This has resulted in the announcement by the RRC of a major family reunification and tracing program in the resettlement areas.

The United States and other western donors should seize upon these new developments to encourage the Ethiopians to pull back from a disastrous policy.

In short, the resettlement program has been suspended, and rather than beat a dead horse on the basis of criticisms and situations that are now a year out of date,[4] the United States and other western donors should act to hold Ethiopian officials to their word that the resettlement program will not start again and that if it does, it will be voluntary and orderly. To do otherwise would jeop-

[4] For example, current congressional resolutions proposing sanctions and other measures against Ethiopia are largely based upon reports of conditions and circumstances that are a full year out-of-date. This is particularly so for those based on the report of the small French medical team, Medicines Sans Frontiers (MSF) a few months ago. Their report, founded too much on hearsay, is outdated and has been criticized by every American voluntary agency and church group working in Ethiopia, by United Nations officials, as well as by officials of the United States Embassy. It is clearly a polemic on which no wise government should now base its policy towards Ethiopia, and neither should the United States Congress through a Congressional resolution.

ardize any possibility of improved United States-Ethiopian relations. With some positive inducements there appears to be strong signs in Addis Ababa that Ethiopia may be quietly willing to adopt this course of action. Certainly, their acknowledgement of the problem of family reunification should mean that any further movement of people will, in fact, be voluntary.

Finally, while the previous criticism is over the timing and implementation of the Ethiopian resettlement program were fully warranted, a visit to two sites suggests that if the Ethiopian authorities had only pursued the program voluntarily and in a more orderly fashion, it would have been not only justified, but full of potential. A simple glance at the virgin lands being opened suggests settlers are being offered genuine opportunities. The land's foliage and fertility are in rich contrast to the stark scenes of the north. There were also no signs now of the alledged malnutrition, high death rates, or prison-like security in the resettlement areas visited.

This assessment was clear after a visit to Asosa, a large settlement only a few miles from the Sudan/Ethiopian border in Welega province. It is an old settlement area which has been in existence approximately 7 years. New sites have been added since early 1985. The older settlement has become entirely self-sufficient in food according to RRC officials. They said that new settlers are not taxed and are not forced to sell at the low market price to the government. The RRC officials expressed the hope that by 1988 the new settlements, some 52,000 people, would also be self-sufficient.

During the visit to Asosa an RRC official involved in the resettlement program for over 2 years said that except for initial plowing by tractors of virgin fields he hoped that oxen would later be used at the resettlement sites. He said that under local conditions tractors were too expensive to use because of maintenance and upkeep, and that oxen obviously did not have these drawbacks. But an RRC official suggested there also might be a political implication if oxen were to be used: private plots would have to be expanded and collectivization could turn into "cooperatives"—a reversal of the current government's ideology.

Asosa has 78 villages and they grow teff (the favored, very delicate wheat grown in Ethiopia), maize, pineapple and vegetables. There are very adequate health centers, schools, mills and graneries. In addition there is some cotton grown which was being made into cloth. Currently there are 10,000 hectares under cultivation and another 10,000 are to be placed under cultivation; all of which are still collectivized. But all settlers are provided with two hectares of private land and currently some have 5 hectares. The local, free enterprise market is thriving.

According to local officials responsible for Asosa, 39 percent of new settlers are not self-sufficient and 60 percent will be self-sufficient by the end of the 1986/87 harvest cycle. Grain grown on the collectivized portion of Asosa is officially being distributed on a point system to those who worked the collectivized portion of the settlement area—but as a practical matter it was simply being equally divided.

There was little or no visible security in the Asosa area—only four or five men with old shotguns and Lee Enfield rifles in the

party headquarter area and no signs of patrols along the roads. Reports of a concentration camp atmosphere are clearly inaccurate.

A second resettlement area was visited at Jarso where Irish Concern volunteers are supporting the resettlement program with the assistance of Canadian funding. Irish Concern usually has six foreign volunteers in Jarso, which has eight villages with a population of 14,000. Resettlers are primarily from Wello but some are also from Tigre. Concern is providing basic farm implements, 100 oxen for each village, and has supported many water catchments, among other projects. Concern representatives said that resettlers were currently given 1 hectare of land for their own private plots but that this might be raised to 5 hectares in the future (but some observers doubt this). In 1985 settlers produced 2.3 months of annual food needs; they are expected to produce 6.5 months' worth in 1986, and hope to be totally self-sufficient by 1988–9.

The health of the population is good and there is no sign of malnutrition. Children up to the age of 15 are given supplementary rations. The population will, according to the officials in charge, remain stable and no additional settlers are expected in the future even though there is additional land cleared to receive them.

The land in these areas obviously has remarkable potential. Four villages in Jarso have water all year—some from natural springs. Again the crops grown are teff, maize, cotton, vegetables, potatoes, and on experimental plots, pineapples, mangoes, peppers and other fruits. Concern said that each village has one small experimental plot.

Finally, without drawing any conclusions, here are three short vignettes from a visit to the resettlement areas:

1. During a brief interview with a village potter who came from Wello, he said that he had been in the Asaso resettlement about 7 years, initially arriving without his family as required at that time. His wife did not join him, although she could have 3 years later. Some weeks ago while at a literacy class, his daughter arrived asking to join him. He also mentioned that he had divorced his wife, but that his daughter and he were both attempting to have the wife come and join them. On the whole he was satisfied with his new life in Asosa, and was seeking family reunification through the RRC.

2. At an unannounced stop at a "tukul" (the small traditional Ethiopian hut), a young woman whose husband was away farming was asked how she liked the new place and whether she wanted to return to her old home in Wello. She had not decided what she would do but she expressed a great sadness at having to leave her mother behind. The sadness of never seeing her mother again because of the mother's age and health was evident as she spoke. She hoped that she would see her sister again but she was still not sure whether she would want to return home again; it was soon to be harvest time, and that would decide: "maybe life would be better if the rains came here."

3. Stopping unannounced to speak with men plowing with oxen on virgin land, one was asked how he liked the new, richer soil. He gestured by picking-up a handful of dirt and replied that in his native village in Wello the land was so good

that if one was hungry you could eat the land itself! But when he was reminded that in Wello there had been little rain, unlike in the new area which had rain, trees and can grow teff, he replied that, yes, we have not trees in Wello and thus no rain but if rain came I would return to my land in Wello.

Obviously, there remains a deep traditional attachment most have for their native land regardless of the lack of fertility or the difficulty they have faced in the past and would face again if they returned to such degraded lands. "No trees, no rain," the villager said, implying that he was instinctively aware of the connection between land degradation and repeated droughts; so he was going to stay where he was in the resettlement area for some time. he was willing to give the resettlement village a try, while still longing (indeed, romanticizing) about the glories of his provincial lands.

In conclusion, there is little doubt that many in the resettlement areas—especially those with divided families—may ultimately desire to return to their former villages. Equally clear, their immediate prospects and longer-term agricultural productivity are better served by staying where they are—which many of them seem to understand. The Government of Ethiopia could meet both objectives if they were to truly announce that there will be freedom of movement. For resettlement schemes to be ultimately successful in traditional, peasant societies, they take time and planning, and they cannot rely on coercion.

"VILLAGIZATION" PROGRAM

A second controversial program the Ethiopian Government has recently launched is "villagization"—an effort to take rural villages in Ethiopia, which are often widely scattered over the countryside, and move the families into a centrally organized and constructed village. The justification offered is that only this will allow the government to better provide civic services—schools, clinics, etc.—without depriving the people of their ability of farm the same lands they currently till.

To outside observers, however, this movement resembles a "strategic hamlet" concept and appears more designed to better exert central government and ideological control than simply providing government services.

The truth is probably in between, but the issue today is whether this program—which was launched with vigor this past year, but which has also been virtually suspended through this planting and harvest season—has, or will have, a negative impact upon the relief operation and contribute unnecessarily to Ethiopia's continuing, structural food deficits. On this point views are divided and the information is still incomplete.

However, it is clear that unlike the resettlement program where the government is pulling back, on villagization senior officials remain firmly committed even though the program is now virtually at a standstill. Because unlike the settlement program which has affected only 600,000 people—only a small fraction of a percentage point of the 43 million people of Ethiopia—villagization could ultimately affect most villagers in the future if fully implemented. Again, whether this affect will be to the good, as the gov-

ernment argues, or whether it will further disrupt and collectivize Ethiopian agricultural production, remains an open question.

But it has disrupted some areas, such as in Harerge province, where local officials have reportedly pursued villagization in a particularly coercive and brutal manner—as tens of thousands of refugees fleeing into neighboring Somalia have told horror stories to representatives of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees. Such actions appear to be related more to the acts of individual provincial or party leaders, rather than to the program as a whole.[5]

Nonetheless, the Ethiopian government should be aware that western donors, particularly the United States, will hardly look favorably upon requests for future food assistance if the implementation of the villagization program becomes part of the problem.

Finally, it remains to be seen how villagization will square with the agreement that the Ethiopian Government has signed with the European Economic Community in support of a new agricultural development program if, in exchange, Ethiopia undertakes fundamental agricultural policy reforms (i.e. more free market and pricing reforms, longer-term land tenure policies, higher budgetary priority for the agricultural sector). If the Ethiopians agree to actually implement these reforms—and they must implement them or E.E.C. funding will immediately cease—they will be taking a step down a far different road to agricultural development than is currently the case—a more pragmatic approach that abandons some of their ideological sacred cows.

This could also open ways for the United States to perhaps offer assistance to Ethiopia consistent with our efforts to promote genuine agricultural development and reform in many other areas of Africa (such as Marxist Mozambique, for example). But EEC officials say that if Ethiopia presses ahead with the villagization program it will complicate, perhaps even undermine, the reforms they have so laboriously negotiated with the Ethiopian Government. In short, it depends upon how Ethiopia implements villagization whether this major new western aid initiative will go forward, and considerable western assistance could be at stake.

FOOD AS A WEAPON

From the outset, there has been a deep concern that food assistance in Ethiopia must not be allowed to be used as a weapon. Although there is a civil conflict underway in Ethiopia—indeed, several conflicts—the United States, other western donors, and the voluntary and international agencies have approached the relief effort with only one goal in mind: to provide food and relief to all who are in need. That must remain the over-riding principle, and continued vigilance is necessary by all concerned to see that it remains so.

Despite the long-standing civil war between the central government in Addis Ababa and the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF), and with the separate Tigrean People's Liberation Front (TPLF), all sides have been pressed to allow international food as-

[5] Many refugees in Somalia have related to interviewers stories of gross mistreatment by Ethiopian officials—confiscation and destruction of property, beatings and rapes. Some are also reported to be fleeing new conscription efforts of the Ethiopian government.

sistance through. This has not always been possible, and there have been serious breaches and many difficulties, yet on the whole it has worked. Food and relief have been distributed to needy people in all areas, those in government held territory as well as in "liberated" zones, and from both sides. The United States has fully supported the relief effort within Ethiopia even as we have contributed to the "cross border" operation from Sudan into cut-off areas in western Eritrea and Tigre. Both operations continue.

But some new danger signs have arisen. First, in a major breach of past practice, TPLF forces deliberately attacked an American voluntary agency operation in Ethiopia. On March 26th, two Ethiopian nurses were killed in cold blood and several others wounded in an attack on the World Vision compound in Alamata. As the U.S. government belatedly noted 3 weeks later in publicly condemning the raid, "the victims were humanitarian relief workers who were innocent, unarmed civilians working to alleviate famine." Subsequent intelligence indicates that the TPLF forces were actually seeking to kidnap or kill the two American and Canadian nurses who normally would have been at the compound.

Such attacks must be condemned in the strongest terms, and those who have in the past sympathized with the Tigreans must be aware that such actions can only jeopardize the cross-border relief effort. The United States cannot support a TPFL/REST operation (the Relief Society of Tigre) if they condon attacks on relief operations in eastern Tigre under government control. And it hardly protects them from retaliatory measures by the Ethiopian Government which have largely been avoided, because of western sympathy and intervention.

Second, a new report by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) from the interior of Tigre suggests there will be severe food shortages before the harvest this year, and that getting sufficient food through the Sudan will be logistically difficult if not impossible. Some food relief from the east—from government controlled regions—will have to open. But these are the very areas where the voluntary agencies' out-reach programs have now come under TPLF attack.

Even as we pressed to open "mercy corridors" of food last year into areas cut-off in Tigre—which resulted in the expanded cross-border operation (over formal Ethiopian objections), today the international community must press again to have all sides honor the distribution of food and relief to those in need. It would be intolerable to use food as a weapon or to reverse the progress that has been achieved in Ethiopia.[6]

Finally, it is a sad commentary that civil strife and warfare is now becoming a leading factor in prolonging the food crisis, not only in Ethiopia, but in several other hard-hit countries of Africa—incuding Sudan, Angola and Mozambique. Conflict and violence—not drought or agricultural failure—are now the leading contributors to continuing famine conditions. Food, in this situation, is now the victim, as weapons of war and conflict take greater priority.

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[6] A similar crisis looms in southern Sudan, as noted elsewhere in this report.

Until this trend is reversed in Africa, there can be no long-term prospects for food self-sufficiency in these areas.

BILATERAL RELATIONS

Although diplomatic relations between the United States and Ethiopia remain cold, and there are fundamental differences in ideology and world view—not the least that Ethiopia remains an ally of the Soviet Union—our diplomatic contacts remain open. The issue today is to see if we can expand and improve them—both in our interests, and in the interests of the Ethiopian people we have successfully tried to assist over the past year and a half.

It understandably rankles many in the United States that even during the period when the United States was the major donor of food and relief—(nearly half a billion dollars in food and other relief since 1984)—there has been no improvement in official relations with Ethiopia. This is true. But what it fails to consider is the extraordinary reservoir of goodwill that exists within Ethiopia towards the United States, despite the official line. Our generous relief contributions have rekindled pro-American sentiment just below the surface.

The darkest days of our relationship came in 1982–83, when the climate in Addis Ababa was so hostile that our Embassy was almost closed, and there was little contact between our diplomats and Ethiopian officials. But although formal diplomatic contacts remain at a low level, and no real resolution of basic bilateral issues has occurred, there are signs that the worst of the chill is over.

First, Ethiopian officials are no longer ignoring or downgrading the role the United States played in the relief effort. In statements to the international press, to visiting Congressional delegations, and by the Foreign Minister, Goshu Wolde, just 3 weeks ago, the Ethiopian Government has now publicly thanked us.

Second, Ethiopia has opened its door to western and international agencies. The government has also issued standing invitations for American journalists and Congressmen to visit any part of Ethiopia. Again, this was emphasized to us by the Foreign Minister.

Third, there are now 40 voluntary agencies operating in Ethiopia—an extraordinary reversal from the position of only a few years ago when the Mengistu government was expelling them from the country. Instead of restricting their operations and movements, the government has often facilitated them, although constant problems remain. As a result, direct American operations and observations in Ethiopia have increased. This increased western presence has helped not only to improve the effectiveness of the relief operation, but also in a modest way to ease human rights conditions in Ethiopia. A greater western presence—such as direct voluntary agency participation in the resettlement areas—can advance these goals and promote the welfare of the Ethiopian people.

Fourth, the Ethiopian Government has supported the role of the U.N. Coordinator in Addis Ababa which, as noted earlier has significantly facilitated the relief effort. The United Nations is now moving to have "U.N. field relief coordinators" who will have

access in monitoring relief and recovery developments throughout the country, including all resettlement sites. This will be a major breakthrough if fully implemented.

Fifth, despite the continuing diplomatic chill, other ties are warming. The Ethiopian Government has permitted the U.S. Information Service to re-establish operations in Addis Ababa, and educational and cultural ties to be expanded. There are Fulbright scholars and regular educational exchanges, and Ethiopian officials as well as academicians have been permitted to travel to the United States on U.S. Government-sponsored programs. In addition, Ethiopian Airlines—the most respected airline in Africa, and a highly capitalist operation in Marxist Ethiopia—is about to purchase a large new order of Boeing aircraft to augment their all-Boeing fleet. These ties are in the interests of the United States and Ethiopia; together, they represent a pattern of improving and expanding bilateral relations.

Sixth, there has been a partial easing of the obstacles confronting our embassy in Addis Ababa. There are now professional, and often normal, diplomatic contacts between lower level American and Ethiopian officals, and there are opportunities for improved contacts at higher levels.

Seventh, and perhaps most important, Ethiopia has now moved to compensate American property losses in Ethiopia—a major irritant for many years. A settlement agreement was signed on December 19, 1985—a month after a public address by Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Chester A. Crocker, expressing Washington's concerns over the lack of improved bilateral relations. In the settlement, Ethiopia agreed to repay $7 million to Americans over a 5 year period; the first payment of $1.5 million has already been made.

Obviously, here and in other areas, the Ethiopians have reponded to our overtures and concerns, and there are signs in Addis Ababa that Ethiopia is searching for other ways to open bilateral talks with the United States, as urged in Crocker's address. Foreign Minster Wolde spoke of his government's general willingness to do so, but serious issues over the scope of the talks remain to be resolved.

There are fundamental issues dividing the United States and the Marxist leaders in Ethiopia, and Ethiopia's reliance and dependence upon the Soviet Union will not soon change. But talk in Washington of supporting "democratic freedom fighters" in Ethiopia defies the reality in the field, because the simple fact is that there are no "democratic freedom fighters" on the ground in Ethiopia, only Marxist guerillas fighting a Marxist government, and they both speak the same Marxist language. Romanticizing to the contrary will not change this reality, only ignore it.

Instead, the course the United States should take in the days ahead—as we phase-down our relief program, but continue to offer our hand of assistance—is to patiently use the goodwill of our past effort to build new relations and new access to influence the Ethiopian Government in whatever positive ways we can. We have done so over the past year and should continue to try during the coming year. If the Ethiopian Government still fails to respond to our concerns, we should obviously reassess our relationship and any fur-

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ther assistance. This is the approach every other Western donor is taking in Addis Ababa; only the United States appears determined to walk out of step and slam the door in our own face.

SUDAN

CURRENT SITUATION

For many months Sudan has been politically adrift, as the military leaders who overthrew the government of former President Gaafer Nimeiri have attempted to arrange elections and return the government back to civilian control. Elections have now been held, and at this writing, a newly elected government is now taking shape.

But during the past several months governmental decisionmaking in Khartoum has been in a state of "suspended animation." Hard decisions have been put-off for the new government, just as those problems have mounted. The nation's economy is in a nosedive, even as insecurity and warfare in the south are on the increase. The array of problems and issues confronting the new government of Sudan is truly staggering.

But despite the litany of bad news from Khartoum, one area of progress can be noted. Over the past year Sudan has substantially recovered from a drought that threatened a famine as bad, if not worse, than that which occurred in neighboring Ethiopia. The flood of refugees pouring into eastern Sudan at the rate of more than 7,000 a day has now become a reverse flow. And the refugee situations in the other areas of the country have stabilized in numbers, even though relief problems persist.

Despite the progress achieved, the prospects for the coming year remain troubling. Not only will there be continuing refugee relief needs, on a scale of this past year, worse is the possibility that the role of the principal donor in Sudan—the United States—will be jeopardized. American Embassy personnel as well as Americans associated with the UNHCR and the voluntary agencies have been evacuated because of insecurity in Khartoum. This is, of course, associated with the recent Libyan incident and comes during a time when the Sudanese government is in flux. Americans working in the field are probably secure, but if the situation in Khartoum cannot be stabilized, a serious interruption in the American contribution to the relief effort could result. Hopefully, calm can be restored as soon as a new government can take charge.

Also troubling are developments in southern Sudan where the spreading civil conflict has isolated many provincial towns and made relief convoys almost impossible. If security conditions do not improve—and they are currently deteriorating—the food situation in southern Sudan among the refugees and other needy people could become critical later this year.

REFUGEE PROBLEMS—EASTERN SUDAN

The flashpoint in Sudan last year was the dramatic influx of Ethiopians fleeing famine and civil strife. Within a few months over 300,000 refugees poured across the border in search of food, water, and shelter. Most did not find them, and many died unnecessarily. The capabilities of the Sudanese had been totally overwhelmed, and the preparations by the UNHCR were inexcusably inadequate. The world was caught unaware only to face a sea of human misery.

Death rates at several of the camps which sprang-up on the dry desert, such as Wad Kowli, soared to levels relief workers had never seen. There was little food, fewer medical supplies, no shelter, and no significant programs for intensive infant feeding. The result was that children weakened by the famine in Ethiopia were dying at horrendous rates.

Relief preparations and supplies were always falling behind the needs as camp populations grew overnight with new arrivals. At Wad Sherife outside Kassala there was total chaos. Prepared for 40,000 refugees, there were actually double that number. Today the camp numbers 120,000. But the difference today is like night and day. Now there is sufficient food and medicines, adequate water and shelter, and the camp is well organized.

REFUGEES IN THE SUDAN

[As of April 1986]

Source	Government estimate of refugee population	Number assisted by UNHCR
Ethiopia	852,000	405,500
Chad	126,000	75,000
Uganda	250,000	129,500
Zaire	5,000	.....
Total	1,233,000	610,000

ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT
LIBYA
RED SEA
NORTHERN
EASTERN
Wadi Halfa
PORT SUDAN
Abu Hammad
DONGOLA
Karima
BERBER
Atbara
Ed Debba
AD DAMER
Shendi
CHAD
Omdurman
KHARTOUM
Dagheim
New Halfa
KASSALA
DARFOUR
KORDOFAN
EL HASAHEISA
WAD MEDANI
Sadiri
Kutum
ED DUEIM
EL GEDAREF
GENEINA
EL FASHER
EL OBEID
Kosti
Sennar
Rabak
Singa
Zalingei
EN NAHUD
Umm Ruwaba
NILE
NYALA
Roseires
Um Haraz
Dilling
ED DAMAZIN
Babanusa
KADUGLI
Talodi
Paloich
MALAKAL
BAHR EL GHAZAL
Aweil
Benitu
Nasir
UPPER NILE
ETHIOPIA
Raga
WAU
Akobo
Tonj
Jonglei
RUMBEK
Pibor Post
BOR
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC
Amadi
Tambura
EQUATORIA
YAMBIO
Maridi
JUBA
Kapoeta
Torit
KENYA
YEI
Nagishot
Nimule
ZAIRE
UGANDA
Paved Roads
Secondary Roads, Unsurfaced
Railways
Rivers
Airports
Regional Boundaries
0 100 200 300 400 km
LIBYA
ARAB REP OF EGYPT
SAUDI ARABIA
NIGER
CHAD
SUDAN
CENTRAL AFRICAN REP
ETHIOPIA
ZAIRE
KENYA
Uganda



source: UNHCR/Khartoum

This sharp contrast was seen everywhere in eastern Sudan. After initial failure, the international community finally mobilized sufficient support for the UNHCR and the voluntary and international agencies to turn the situation around. And while the long-term issue of how we are to deal with those refugees who remain—perhaps 250,000—great progress has nonetheless been achieved in dealing with their basic on-going relief needs.

Wad Sherife.—Over the past year, this camp has spread out for many miles, stretching across the hot, empty desert. The shelters are minimal and the conditions hardly comfortable, but at least no one is starving. And over the coming year the UNHCR and Sudanese government hope to reduce the size dramatically and close it eventually.

Although 120,000 refugees are in the camp, no census has been taken recently, and UNHCR believes the actual figure to be closer to 110,000, even though in recent weeks several thousand new refugees have arrived from Eritera. CARE operates throughout the camp a well organized dry-food distribution program, and five feeding centers for undernourished children are operated by the Swiss Red Cross and the American Refugee Committee.

The long-range plan is to move the refugees who do not wish to return—and that appears to include most of the Eritreans (weary of the years of fighting and deprivation). Sites are now being considered where they can be assisted into becoming self-sufficient (as they did with the earlier wave of some 400,000 Eritrean refugees who came in the late 1970's, before last year's influx).

For at least another several years, it appears the UNHCR will need to continue to provide care and maintenance for those refugees in camps and, as they are removed to resettlement sites, transitional assistance to help them become self-sufficient. There seems every propsect that this can be achieved, unless another drought nor new influx of refugees again rolls back the progress UNHCR achieved before in settling and normalizing the lives of Eritrean refugees.

In this connection, a new development has occurred in Kassala which worries Sudanese and UNHCR relief officials—and that is the growing anti-refugee sentiment among the local population. Local Sudanese are beginning to feel that the large refugee population is adversely affecting local resources—water, foliage, and civic services. There is a growing complaint that while the international community has given massive food and relief assistance to the refugees, the local infrastructure and community services have been ignored, even as the presence of the refugees have had a negative impact upon them.

This, of course, was the impetus behind the second International Conference on Assistance to Refugees in Africa (ICARA III), and the United States has pledged to support projects that will help alleviate the impact of large-scale refugee movements on local populations. That is very much the case today in Sudan. Although A.I.D. has considered several such projects, and funds were set-aside, they were used instead to meet the increased needs of this year's relief operation.

However, given the new pressures building in Kassala and other areas of eastern Sudan, the United States should join with others in trying to fund some ICARA II projects—and soon.

Wad Kowli. From a near cesspool environment that had the highest mortality rate registered anywhere since the worst days of World War II, within a year conditions have been totally reversed. This is entirely due to the massive effort of the United States and other donors, the mobilization of UNHCR field workers, and the presence of several international and voluntary agencies.

Wad Kowli is still located on an untenable site in terms of water supply, and it will be shortly closed (and used only as a transit center if needed). This will be possible because the Tigrean refugee population in this camp of 35,000 people are in the process of voluntarily returning to Ethiopia. Some 55,000 moved back last year, even though the UNHCR and voluntary agencies urged that stay longer to recover. This year the movement will be more organized, implemented by REST, and the refugees will be given more seeds, food and other supplies to allow them to return and plant their crops before the rains come.

This movement is now underway, and it can only be hoped that it will be successful. However, recent reports from the interior of Tigre suggest food supplies are seriously short in many areas—except in the west, where the cross-border operation provides safety net. Unless the returning refugees are able to plant and harvest a crop, a return flow into Sudan may occur next autumn.

REFUGEES IN WESTERN SUDAN

The influx of refugees from Chad began in mid-1984. Over 120,000 refugees are estimated to have entered Sudan, fleeing drought and famine, but also escalating conflict in northern Chad. The situation, as noted earlier, has stabilized, but food and relief must be sustained through at least next year.

What has not changed are the extraordinarily difficult logistical problems involved in the relief effort. Last year, a serious shortfall in supplies occurred in the field because the lone and fragile rail link to Nyala and the road to El Geneina were both blocked because of the rains. As a consequence, this year an attempt is being made to stockpile sufficient food to carry the relief program through the rainy season without interruption. It remains, however, a close race between logistical obstacles and the arrival of the rains. But there is hope this year that the race will be won.

REFUGEES IN SOUTHERN SUDAN

Some 124,000 refugees from Uganda are located in 30 settlements on the West Bank and 17 on the East Bank of the Nile River in Equatoria Sudan—many of which are becoming self-sufficent in food production. Another 125,000 Ugandans are thought by the Sudanese to have spontaneously settled in the Equatoria region, who are outside the UNHCR program. As conditions and political factions have changed in Uganda over the past months, there has been a movement back and forth. However, the numbers seem stable for now.

Again, the rising insecurity in the south now poses the principal obstacle to the work of the UNHCR and the ICRC. Until the security situation is clarified, or, even better, a settlement to the conflict is negotiated by the new government, conditions in the field will remain precarious.

UNHCR OPERATIONS IN SUDAN

After a chaotic beginning in late 1984, the UNHCR moved effectively to deal with the mounting refugee crisis in Sudan. A simple look at their organizational chart today shows that to deal with the emergency the UNHCR went from a handful of officers in the field to one of its largest field establishments in the world.

There are not UNHCR offices in Port Sudan, Showak, Gedaref, El Geneina, Nyala, Juba and Yei, all linked to Khartoum by radio. There are field officers at the camps and reception centers. The international staff now numbers 66 officers. The UNHCR Emergency Operation is also closely co-ordinated with other components of the overall UN Emergency Operation in the Sudan.

UNHCR assistance to refugees in the Sudan is largely implemented by the Office of the Sudanese Commissioner for Refugees (COR), the focal point within the Government for all matters concening refugees. Voluntary agencies are also implementing significant parts of the program, the majority with at least partial funding from UNHCR under tripartite agreements. Substantial contributions have been made by voluntary agencies from their own resources, notably Oxfam and Save the Children of England. Voluntary agencies have assumed responsibility for most services in the health and supplementary feeding sectors. Government disaster corps and the League of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies are also active.

Until November 1984 assistance to new arrivals was funded from within the UNHCR program. Since then the High Commissioner has issued several appeals to the international community for emergency assistance, raising the target as the needs escalated. The total contributions to the UNHCR emergency program in Sudan, in cash and kind, as of January 30, 1986 was $79.5 million for eastern Sudan, $10.3 million for western Sudan, for a total of $89.9 million. This does not include, however, direct contributions by the voluntary agencies or governments to bilateral assistance programs.

The most recent appeal was issued on February 25, 1986 and for $39.7 million for newly arrived Ethiopians in Eastern Sudan and $12.1 million for Chadians in Western Sudan for the period through December 1986. These appeals were closely coordinated with those issued by the U.N. Office for Emergency Operations in Africa.

Although serious relief problems persist in Sudan, there is a sense that the program is now under control. Given continued support by the international community, the UNHCR and the voluntary and international agencies, are now well positioned to help the Sudanese government cope with the three separate refugee problems along its borders. While logistical and distribution problems will remain, given Sudan's poor road and transport system,

ways have been found to get food out when and where it is needed. That is a remarkable change from the situation a year ago.

The only serious threat to the program will be a deterioration of the security situation, a weakened central government, or a new influx of refugees. Obviously, the situation must be closely monitored so that the international community is not once again caught unaware of an impending human tragedy.

SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS

ETHIOPIA

1. CONTINUING RELIEF AND RECOVERY NEEDS

As outlined in this report, extraordinary progress has been achieved over the past year in dealing with the massive threat of famine in Ethiopia. Only a few months ago, drought threatened the lives of millions of men, women and children. Today, over 7 million of these people have been saved—thanks to the response and generosity of the international community, led by the United States. Last year saw a food bridge to rural Ethiopia unequaled in recent years.

While assistance to date has helped to avert a human catastrophe, continuing needs will remain next year. Food needs for this calendar year—some 900,000 metric tons—have been identified and pledges for that amount are now in the pipeline (including 300,000 tons from the United States). However, there is still a $200 million shortage in non-food aid for this year for health programs, water resources, spare parts, etc. The United States should consider filling some of these gaps if other donors also respond.

Food needs for 1987 are not yet clear. What is clear, however, is that we must not dismantle the current voluntary agency network of outreach and assistance so successfully established over the past year—nor signal the end to the A.I.D. program—until after the harvest next autumn when actual food needs can be fully assessed. To do otherwise would be to abandon a successful relief effort for which the American people can be proud, as well as unnecessarily risk the spectre of thousands of people once again fleeing new famine conditions in the countryside.

But even if the harvest this year proves as good as projected, their will remain critical rehabilitation and recovery programs which the United States should consider funding—not only on the merits of the programs themselves, but also as a continuing signal of assistance to the Ethiopian people. Also, the second year of the theoretical "two year cycle" following a relief operation—when outside assistance should shift from disaster and relief to longer-term development assistance—will not occur until the 1987 harvest.

Congress should be prepared to support a reasonable, although considerably reduced, program of recovery and humanitarian assistance through the 1987 fiscal year. The exact amount depends upon the ultimate food and relief needs, as well as the recovery programs proposed by the voluntary agencies.

2. RESETTLEMENT ISSUE

Following considerable pressure and criticism, from abroad and quietly at home, the Ethiopian Government has now completely

suspended further resettlement of Ethiopians from the north. This new fact must elicit a new response from the United States.

Our criticisms were well taken and have had considerable impact in Addis Ababa. We should now seize this opportunity to keep the Ethiopians to their word—given at high levels of their government—that the resettlement program will not be resumed on a coercive or large-scale basis. Resettlement should never be attempted at the previous levels and should avoid the coercion and chaos of 1984–85. We should seek ways to assure that this pledge becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy. We can do so in several ways:

First, we should commend the U.N. representative for appointing "U.N. field relief coordinators" to observe (i.e., monitor) all aspects of the rehabilitation and recovery efforts underway in Ethiopia—including the resettlement program. This is a role the government previously resisted, almost as strongly as the United States proposed it. But a compromise has been reached, and it should be in the interests of all parties—the western donors and the Ethiopian Government—to implement it. If serious health or human rights problems exist in the resettlement areas, they should now be detected by these U.N. "field relief coordinators" and the problems addressed. And any future resettlement, even on a reduced scale, should be equally monitored to assure that it is voluntary.

Second, the United States should encourage, perhaps even fund, small-scale programs by American voluntary agencies in the resettlement areas to help the people. The example of the Irish voluntary agency Concern in Jarso should be repeated. The more western, outside observers who can visit and work in the resettlement areas, the better the chance to address our stated concerns over the welfare and the rights of the settlers. Rather than simply continuing verbal criticism (as deserved as it was during the early days of the resettlement program and through mid-1985) the fact is that it has now been suspended and we should respond to this new development and offer constructive assistance. The harsh rhetoric of the past will only foreclose these options.

Nonetheless, the Ethiopians cannot help but be aware that any large-scale resumption of forced resettlement will fundamentally jeopardize continued U.S. assistance and any further bilateral relations. Congressional sentiment on this has been received in Addis Ababa loud and clear.

3. ROLE OF THE U.N. COORDINATOR

As outlined earlier, the presence and role of a U.N. coordinator in Ethiopia (and Sudan) has had an extraordinarily positive impact upon the effectiveness of the international relief operation. While this was particularly critical at the outset, this U.N. coordinating umbrella remains an important asset so long as relief, rehabilitation and recovery assistance comes from abroad. The U.N. coordinator's office should be continued for at least an additional year.

4. SPECIAL PLIGHT OF FAMINE ORPHANS

As noted earlier, there are estimated to be over 20,000 to 25,000 orphans or abandoned children in Ethiopia under 16 years of age. They deserve urgent and special attention.

Senior Ethiopian officials are deeply concerned over this tragic legacy of the famine which, if unattended, could become a festering social issue. There are no easy answers, but the government has launched an effort to identify possible relatives and through government assistance help them care for these children in the extended family. Finding foster homes is also being pursued. And additional orphanages are under consideration.

The United States should indicate our willingness to contribute generously to any reasonable program established by the government to assist these children—either through a voluntary agency, the government, or international agency. We should also urge the Ethiopian authorities to seek the assistance of those international agencies, such as the International Committee of the Red Cross with its expertise in tracing families, to assist them in finding as many living family members as possible. That, clearly, would be the best solution.

In the meantime, far greater efforts must be made to improve the living conditions and the programs for assisting these children of the famine.

5. BILATERAL RELATIONS WITH ETHIOPIA

There remain fundamental and largely unreconcilable differences between the United States and the existing Marxist government in Addis Ababa—not the least in that it has become an ally of the Soviet Union. That said, and given these obvious constraints, it has been a significant achievement that both the U.S. Government as well as American church and voluntary agency representatives have been able to gain such access in Ethiopia today. Although reluctantly at first, Marxist Ethiopia has cracked its door open to the west, and we have come a long way from the point in 1982–83 when we almost broke diplomatic relations. We should try and keep it open—at least for another year—to see how they will respond.

Although the goodwill that has been established by America's generous support of the Ethiopian relief effort is yet to be reflected in our official diplomatic relations, any visitor to Ethiopia can sense the spirit of goodwill that exists toward the American people. The course the United States should take in the days ahead should be to build upon this spirit and attempt to establish better relations and keep continued access to Ethiopia—both to influence the government where we can, as well as to help those people in need.

SUDAN

1. CONTINUED SUPPORT FOR UNHCR PROGRAMS

The Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees should be commended for the outstanding progress achieved in finally coping with the flood of refugees into Sudan. The UNHCR program clearly deserves continued American support.

In the East, this will mean care and maintenance assistance until the remaining Ethiopian refugees—some 300,000 Eritreans who do not want to return home—achieve self-sufficiency within two to three years. In the West, the Chadian refugee situation has

stabilized but will still require continued relief assistance. And in the south, where the refugee situation is particularly volatile and where access is threatened by the expanding civil war, outside assistance will be needed. However, much will depend on whether the new government in Khartoum can reach a settlement in the south and restore peace and security.

2. SUPPORT FOR ICARA II PROJECTS

The United States committed itself last year to support projects agreed to at the ICARA II Conference—programs designed to assist local populations impacted by influxes of refugees. This is particularly acute today in eastern Sudan in the Kassala region.

Although funds were set aside for these purposes by A.I.D. in Sudan, the escalating costs of the on-going relief operation depleted them before they could be used. Additional funds should be found. The amounts will not be large—perhaps some $5 million this year—but they will be important substantively as well as symbolically.

APPENDIX I: STATISTICAL SUMMARY OF INTERNATIONAL RELIEF ASSISTANCE TO ETHIOPIA—1985–86

1985

TOTAL EMERGENCY ASSISTANCE TO ETHIOPIA—UNITED STATES FISCAL YEAR 1985

[In thousands of dollars]

Country	Food aid	Non-food air	Total aid
Australia	$14,474	$9,849	$24,323
Austria	1,080	830	1,910
Belgium	3,970	3,109	7,079
Bulgaria	5,219	8,916	14,135
Canada	41,974	10,044	52,018
China	4,082	3,163	7,245
Cuba	1,610	774	2,384
Czechoslovakia	3,010	2,852	5,862
Denmark	514	4,028	4,542
E.E.C.	59,951	22,650	82,601
Finland	2,378	796	3,174
France	5,448	370	5,818
German D.R.	1,353	10,036	11,389
Germany F.R.	17,124	55,076	72,200
Greece	4,801	152	4,953
Hungary	1,754	700	2,454
Iceland	51	.....	51
India	15,390	.....	15,390
Iran	1,392	.....	1,392
Ireland	1,232	.....	1,232
Italy	6,940	49,344	56,284
Japan	6,169	18,178	24,347
Korea Rep.	150	710	860
Libya	270	1,836	2,106
Netherlands	5,735	2,705	8,440
New Zealand	38	.....	38
Norway	5,611	360	5,971
Pakistan	135	.....	135
Poland	3,480	4,215	7,695
Romania	1,000	19,000	20,000
Spain	4,060	600	4,660
Sweden	5,560	12,250	17,810
Switzerland	4,620	2,467	7,087
U.S.S.R.	.....	260,000	260,000
United Kingdom	7,660	37,205	44,865
U.S.A.	253,473	28,843	282,316
Yugoslavia	5,514	133	5,647
Zimbabwe	3,750	.....	3,750
United Nations Organizations:			
FAO	.....	4,200	4,200
UNDRO	.....	1,655	1,655
UNHCR	6,752	8,761	15,513
UNICEF	6,760	26,396	33,156
WHO	.....	220	220
WFP	13,994	3,418	17,412
Total	528,478	615,841	1,144,319

UNITED STATES EMERGENCY ASSISTANCE TO ETHIOPIA—FISCAL YEAR 1985 FOOD AID

[Dollars in thousands]

Recipient [1]	Metric tons		Value of MT approved [2]
	Commodities approved	Arrived in Ethiopia	
CARE	41,527	41,526	$22,364.3
CDAA	161,194	156,745	108,546.0
CRS—Emergency	40,558	40,558	22,356.6
CRS—Regular	11,869	11,869	5,369.7
CRS—North	9,000	5,000	4,763.0
CRS—MC	4,654	4,654	2,833.8
ICRC	37,635	37,635	18,086.3
ICRC/CRDA (Seeds)	5,000	5,000	1,350.0
LICROSS	11,610	11,610	5,483.9
RRC	50,000	50,203	18,833.0
SAVE	17,401	16,024	9,340.9
WFP/IEER	9,973	9,979	5,165.1
WVRO	35,464	35,120	24,137.0
WVRO—North	8,100	.....	4,843.8
Subtotal	443,985	425,923	253,473.4

[1] Full names on back.
[2] Includes commodity, ocean freight and internal freight.

Nonfood aid—value of approval

Item	*Thousands*
ADRA (blankets, medicines, logistics)	$621.1
ADRA (airfreight)	12.5
Africare (medical teams)	300.0
AJJDC (medical, shelter supplies)	350.0
CARE (food monitors)	397.6
Concern (plastic sheeting)	55.8
FFH (support for feeding and medical services)	683.8
Heifer Project International (Draft Oxen)	540.0
Helen Keller International (medical support)	34.2
ICRC (air transport of trucks)	400.0
Interaction (support for Flying Tigers)	17.1
RRC (fuel costs for food airlift)	25.0
RRC (blankets, plastic sheeting)	170.2
Transamerica (emergency food airlifts)	16,627.3
UNDRO (monitoring/coordination support)	65.5
UNICEF (truck leasing and tires)	1,000.0
UNICEF (water to displaced persons)	750.0
UNICEF (relief flight from Europe)	53.0
WASH (water/sanitation)	150.0
WVRO (air/ground transport, water, medicines)	1,597.6
WVRO (feeding center expansion)	3,808.0
WVRO (18,000 blankets)	71.1
WVRO (operating costs for Twin Otters)	1,113.0
Subtotal nonfood assistance	28,842.8
Total U.S. emergency assistance	282,316.2

1986

SUMMARY OF U.S. FISCAL YEAR 1986 FOOD AID

The United States is providing 350,665 MT of food aid to Ethiopia in U.S. fiscal year 1986, which began on October 1, 1985 and ends on September 30, 1986.

The total includes 312,463 MT of emergency food aid for famine relief, 17,437 MT for regular feeding programs, and 20,765 MT for seed swaps (U.S. wheat in exchange for Ethiopian seed). The following table breaks out the U.S. food allocations, by the recipient NGO which actually handles the food distribution within Ethiopia.

[Dollars in thousands]

	Metric tons	Dollar value
New emergency food:		
CARE	66,400	$26,543.3
Joint Relief Partners	90,000	36,164.9
CRS-Food for North	21.592	15,191.1
ICRC	25,000	11,335.6
Food for the Hungry	7,000	2,526.7
League of Red Cross	10,000	4,145.4
Save the Children	20,000	7,538.1
World Vision	40,000	19,185.6
World Vision-North	15,545	12,530.2
Ethiopian Orthodox Church	4,463	1,292.4
Subtotal	300,000	136,453.3
Carryover from fiscal year 1985:		
CRS-Food for North	4,000	2,814.2
World Vision-North	8,100	6,529.1
World Vision	363	174.1
Subtotal	12,463	9,517.4
Regular feeding programs:		
Catholic Relief Services	12,783	5,237.0
Missionaries of Charity	4,654	1,825.8
Subtotal	17,437	7,062.8
Seed swaps:		
American Joint Distribution	2,677	639.5
CARE	1,859	447.7
CRDA	2,717	651.9
CRDA	3,000	1,134.0
Catholic Relief Services	2,257	541.5
ICRC	1,261	302.7
Save the Children	1,457	349.6
World Vision	4,412	1,059.1
Unallocated	1,125	271.6
Subtotal	20,765	5,397.6
Total USG contribution	350,665	158,431.1

UNITED STATES EMERGENCY FOOD AID TO ETHIOPIA FISCAL YEAR 1986

[Dollars in thousands]

Recipient [2]	Commodities approved (metric tons)	Commodity cost	Ocean Freight	Internal transport	Total value
CARE	66,400	$11,681.0	[1] $11.008.1	$3,856.6	$26,545.7
CRS-Reg	12,783	3,715.3	1,521.7	.....	5,237.0
CRS-North	16,825	4,744.9	3,019.7	4,072.7	11,837.3
CRS-MC	4,654	1,150.7	674.9	.....	1,825.6
EOC	4,463	817.4	475.0	287.9	1,580.3
FFH	7,000	1,202.9	737.6	582.6	2,526.7
ICRC	19,925	6,145.6	2,888.9	.....	9,034.5
JRP	75,000	19,238.2	10,899.2	.....	30,137.4
LICROSS	5,000	1,347.6	725.1	291.0	2,363.7
SAVE	14,125	2,507.4	1,783.8	932.6	5,323.8
WVRO	40,363	10,279.6	5,852.6	3,227.5	19,359.7
WVRO-North	12,049	5,610.5	2,921.7	1,180.0	9,712.2
Total	278,587	68,541.1	42,508.3	14,434.5	125,483.9
Nonfood operational grants					30,654.3
Total U.S. emergency assistance					156,138.2

[1] Includes $1,380,000 for inland transportation Mombasa/Sidamo.
[2] Full names on back.

Names of Recipients

AJJDC—American Joint Jewish Distribution Committee.
CARE—No longer an acronym.
CRDA—Christian Relief and Development Association.
CRS—Reg—Catholic Relief Services—Regular Program.
CRS—North—Catholic Relief Services—Food for the North Initiative.
CRS—MC—Catholic Relief Services—Missionaries of Charity.
EOC—Ethiopian Orthodox Church.
FFH—Food for the Hungry.
ICRC—International Committee of the Red Cross.
JRP—Joint Relief Partnership.
LICROSS—League of Red Cross Societies.
PFP—Partnership for Productivity.
SAVE—Save the Children, U.S.
WVRO—World Vision Relief Organization.
WVRO—North—WORLD Vision Relief Organization—Food for the North Initiative.

AID/ADDIS RECOMMENDED FUNDING LEVELS AND AID/W APPROVAL LEVELS FOR SELECTED PROJECTS

The following table shows the level of funding proposed by AID/Addis Ababa and the final level approved by AID/W for selected projects. Only those projects that were cut substantially or eliminated by AID/W are shown. The attached sheet shows all approved projects.

Project	Aid/Addis recommendation	Aid/W approval
Relief:		
World Vision Air Support	$1,381,000	0
Food for the Hungry Distribution/Medical Centers	807,000	$468,273
CARE Hararghe Distribution Centers	952,000	500,000
Recovery:		
World Vision Agricultural Packages	9,000,000	[1] 4,058,900
AJJDC Agricultural Packages	1,500,000	[2] 992,500
UNICEF Tools/Oxen	500,000	0
UNICEF Water Projects	1,300,000	0
Helen Keller International Blindness Prevention	375,000	0
Total	15,810,000	6,019,673

[1] Includes grant of $3 million and Pulbic Law 480 tranche of $1,058,900 for seed swap.
[2] Includes grant of $350,000 million and Public Law 480 tranche of $642,500 for seed swap.

APPENDIX II: STATISTICAL SUMMARY OF PRINCIPAL VOLUNTARY AGENCY PROGRAMS IN ETHIOPIA: 1985–86

FISCAL YEAR 1986 PROGRAM SUMMARY

Sponsor: Joint Relief Partnership [JRP] (Formerly CDAA).
Consignee: Catholic Relief Services [CRS].
AID/Addis Ababa proposed levels: Beneficiaries: 707,500. Tonnage: 90,000 MT.
AID/Washington approvals to date:

[Dollars in thousands]

Commodities	Metric tons	Arrivals	Commodity	Ocean freight	Internal transport	Totals
Vegetable oil	5,250	2,317				
CSM	713	238				
Bulgar	53,262	27,971				
NFDM	5,775	4,450				
SFSG	10,000	4,425				
Total	75,000	39,401	$19,238.2	$10,899.2		$30,137.4

Program description: In 1984, the Catholic and Protestant Churches combined their resources and established an international network known as "Churches Drought Action Africa (CDAA)". The European partners are Caritas International, Lutheran World Federation, and the World Council of Churches. In December 1985, CDAA changed its name to Joint Relief Partnership (JRP).

Executive members of JRP are the Ethiopian Catholic Secretariat, Ethiopian Evangelical Church Mekane Yesus/Lutheran World Federation and Catholic Relief Services. Operating agencies include Catholic missions. CRDA, Irish Concern, Ethiopian Evangelical Church Mekane Yesus, Jesuit Relief Services, Norwegian Chruch Aid, Seventh Day Adventists, Baptist Mission, Red Barna, SCF/UK, Ethiopian Orthodox Church and the Society of International Missionaries.

Since beginning its operations in October 1984, JRP, with CRS providing the main bureaucracy, has expanded from 500,000 recipients to approximately 1.5 million. Currently, there are 88 JRP operating centers, where people receive ratios. Please see the attached map for the area of the country in which the major JRP operating agencies (CRS, ECS, and LWF) are distributing food.

The program is targeted toward: 1) children under age five and lactating mothers; 2) severely undernourished children in need of intensive feeding; and 3) the destitute, aged, and handicapped. With the exception of the "on-site" feeding programs for severely undernourished children, the program is based upon a dry take-home ration of 45.36 kgs of processed cereal, 4 kgs of NFDM and

3.6 kgs of oil per family, average size estimated at five members. This supplies each family member 10.6 kg/month or 353 grams/day. The JRP centers also monitor height for weight of children and use the nutritional data generated to determine participation in the program.

CRS teaches commodity reporting and accountability to its implementing agencies and is the agency responsible for compiling and submitting data to AID/Addis. Narrative and statistical reports on the JRP program are compiled on a quarterly basis.

In October 1985, AID/Addis informed JRP of its 900,000 MT estimate of the food deficit in Ethiopia for 1986 and, that its recommendation for a JRP level for FY 1986 of 90,000 MT. CRS/ECS has not aligned its program to correspond to the 90,000 MT allocation from the USG; the latest JRP plan calls for distribution over a nine month period, and significant increases in the manner of beneficiaries to be reached. These increases (in the CRS/ECS program) over those reached in 1985 are: 34,000 additional beneficiaries in Eritrea, 58,000 in Tigre. 354,000 in Harerge, and 21,650 in Gonder. A hold on calls forward is in effect until AID/Addis approves the 1986 JRP distributional plan. AID/Addis has already reviewed and approved the LWF/Mekane Yesus plan for fiscal year 1986, but cannot proceed with calls forward until all JRP issues are resolved. JRP receives food from a number of other donors, but AID/Addis has not been informed exactly how much other donor food has been placed for FY 1986.

Logistics: CRS receives cargo at the ports of Assab, Massawa and Djibouti. Cargo at Djibouti is shipped by rail to Dire Dawa, Nazareth and Addis Ababa. Commodities landed at Messawa are transported to Asmara by Ketana trucks. From Asmara to secondary distribution points, transport is handled by CRS vehicles, and when there is unused capacity, by Food for the North trucks. Food unloaded at the port of Assab is moved to primary warehouses in Kombolcha and Dessie by Kenya trucks. From primary and secondary distribution centers, transport is handled by Ketana and CRS/LWF private trucks.

Sponsor: Catholic Relief Services [CRS]—Regular.

Approvals: Beneficiaries: 188,000. Tonnage: 12,783 MT.

[Dollars in thousands][1]

Commodities	Metric tons	Arrivals	Commodity	Ocean freight	Internal transport	Total
NFDM	5,141	1,003				
SFSG	5,141	1,697				
Vegetable oil	2,501	924				
Total	12,783	3,624	$3,715.3	$1,521.7		$5,237

Program description: Eighteen centers are serving pre-school children and their mothers in Addis Ababa, Nazareth, Wonji, Alemetena, Dire Dawa, Harer and Meki, plus drought-affected areas of Tigre, as shown on the attached map. Institutionalized children and destitutes are also served.

Each child and its mother enrolled in the CRS food and nutrition program receives a ration of 2 kilos of SF sorghum grits, 2 kilos of non-fat dry milk and 1 kilo of oil per month. Thus a family receives a monthly minimum of 10 kilos. Each child's progress is monitored, using the weight/height/age measurements, per month.

Logistics: All commodities are brought in through the port of Djibouti, and transported inland on the Ethiopia-Djibouti railway.

Sponsor: Catholic Relief Services [CRS]—Food for the North Initiative.

AID/Addis Ababa proposed levels: Beneficiaries: 230,000. Tonnage: 21,592 MT.

AID/Washington approvals to date:

[Dollars in thousands]

Commodities	Metric tons	Arrivals	Commodity	Ocean freight	Internal transport	Total
SFSG	9,550	5,900				
CSM	7,275	5,862				
Total	16,825	11,762	$4,744.9	$3,019.7	$4,072.7	$11,837.3

Program description: The Ethiopian Catholic Secretariat (ECS) implements the CRS Food for the North program in Eritrea, through local mission churches. ECS is reaching approximately 230,000 beneficiaries per month in all eight awrajas of Eritrea. The full monthly ration is 10 kgs of SFSG and five kgs of CSM per person. At present, many beneficiaries, who have the benefit of December's small harvest, receive half rations, but are expected to go back to full rations in April. Drought victims from conflict areas are the main recipients; but people displaced by conflict and drought within government controlled areas also receive rations. Catholic clergy have countryside access in most areas, giving them a good understanding of the agricultural situation and nutritional needs in Eritrea. However, ECS does not do nutritional surveys. AID/Addis has requested objective nutritional information. ICRC and ECS work very closely together and coordinate distributions in order to prevent duplication of effort. Awrajas, woredas and even towns are divided up between the two organizations.

Logistics: Title II commodities are received at the port of Massawa. From there commodities are moved by CRS's trucks, which were purchased especially for the program with 100% USAID funding.

Sponsor: CRS—Missionaries of Charity (Mother Teresa).

AID/Addis Ababa proposed levels: Beneficiaries: 14,140. Tonnage: 4,654 MT.

AID/Washington approval to date:

[Dollars in thousands]

Commodities	Metric tons	Arrivals	Commodity	Ocean freight	Internal transport	Total
SFSG	2,994	614				
Rice	264	87				

[Dollars in thousands]

Commodities	Metric tons	Arrivals	Commodity	Ocean freight	Internal transport	Total
NFDM	920	287				
Beans	41	27				
Oil	435	33				
Total	4,654	1,048	$1,150.7	$674.9		$1,825.6

Program description: Food is distributed to destitutes in Dire Dawa, Jijiga and Jimma in Harerge region and in Addis Ababa. Please note these sites on the attached map.

In the seven active distribution centers which the Missionaries of Charity operate, recipients are divided into the following categories: "Most Critical" (receive medication and 4–5 meals/day as required); "Recovery" (receive three meals/day and medication); and "Infirm" (receive three meals/day). In addition, several centers provide one cooked meal a day to the destitute individuals. Dry rations are also dispensed.

Logistics: Catholic Relief Services is responsible for ordering of food and facilitates port clearance and transportation to distribution points. CRS also handles all required reporting.

Sponsor: CARE.

AID/Addis Ababa proposed level: Beneficiaries: 650,000. Tonnage: 66,400 MT.

AID/Washington approved to date:

[Dollars in thousands]

Commodities	Metric tons	Arrivals	Commodity	Ocean freight	Internal transport	Total
Bulgur	63,988	6,259				
CSM	610	680				
Vegetable oil	1,802	279				
Total	66,400	7,218	$11,681.0	$11,008.1	$3,856.6	$26,545.7

Program description: Harerge—Major crop failures in Harerge in 1985 have necessitated the expansion of the CARE program in that region. This includes the following awrajas: Chercher, Wobera, Habro, Harer Zuria, Jijiga, Garamuleta, Gursum and Dire Dawa. One million persons are estimated to be in need in the highland areas. CARE is distributing dry rations to 600,000 beneficiaries, with ration size of 12 kg of bulgur and .45 kg of oil per person per month.

Sidamo—This region suffered almost a total crop failure last year as well as the loss of 95% of the pastoralists' calves. CARE fed 30,000 in Arero awraja and is expanding into Borena, thus serving a total of 50,000 beneficiaries in Sidamo.

Ongoing nutrition surveys in both regions help to establish baseline data for better targeting of food. CARE also receives commodities from Canada.

Logistics: All commodities for Harerge are brought in through the port of Djibouti and transported by truck and rail to a large warehouse rented to CARE by the Agricultural Marketing Corporation in Dire Dawa. From there they are transported by CARE's 30 long-haul and 4 short-haul trucks to the 17 distribution sites. Commodities utilized in the Sidamo operations are carried from the port of Mombasa in Kenya across the southern Ethiopian border by a Kenyan trucking company under contract to CARE. CARE has just purchased 8 new trucks for distribution within Sidamo.

Sponsor: Ethiopian Orthodox Church (EOC).

AID/Addis Ababa proposed level: Beneficiaries: 70,000. Tonnage: 4,463.

AID/Washington approved to date:

[Dollars in thousands]

Commodities	Metric tons	Arrivals	Commodity	Ocean freight	Internal transport	Totals
Wheat	3,825					
Vegetable oil	302					
NFDM	336					
Total	4,463		$817.4	$475.0	$287.9	$1,580.3

Program description: In FY 1985, the Ethiopian Orthodox Church received a monthly allocation of 800 MT of USG food, as an operating agent of the CDAA consortium. CRS, the technical arm of CDAA, subsequently informed EOC that it would not receive a similar allocation from CDAA in FY 1986, because CDAA's allocation of USG food had been greatly reduced. A high-level EOC official approached the US Charge requesting a separate allocation. During a visit to Ethiopia in August 1985, AID Administrator McPherson had suggested opening a direct channel with the EOC through a separate food allocation.

EOC conducts emergency feeding programs at six sites in Hagaz in Eritrea; Mekelle in Tigre; Haik in Wello; Addis Zemen in Gonder; Deder in Harerge; and Agarfa in Bale. The standard JRP ration of 45 kgs of wheat, 4 kgs of milk and 3.6 kgs of oil is distributed per family of five. EOC is distributing to some 70,000 beneficiaries. The USG allocation is meant to support EOC's ongoing emergency programs for the six month period April through September 1986, when the CDAA allocation will have run out.

Logistics: Food for Hagaz and Mekelle will arrive at Massawa and will be transported to Asmara on the WTOE fleet. From Asmara it will be delivered to distribution sites on either EOC or CRDA trucks. Food for the other centers will arrive at Assab and will be transported to primary warehouses at Dessie and Addis Ababa on WTOE trucks. Onward transportation to distribution centers will be on EOC and CRDA trucks.

Sponsor: Food for the Hungry (FHI).

AID/Addis Ababa proposed level: Beneficiaries: 76,000. Tonnage: 7,000 MT.

AID/Washington approved to date:

[Dollars in thousands]

Commodities	Metric tons	Arrivals	Commodity	Ocean freight	Internal transport	Total
CSM	618	231				
Vegetable oil	217	107				
Wheat	6,165	1,100				
Total	7,000	1,438	$1,202.9	$737.6	$586.2	$2,526.7

Program description: FHI is operating five sites in S. Shewa region (Alaba 1, Alaba 11, Enamor, Ameya and Danno) and two sites in Gayiant awraja, Gonder region (Robit and Wogada). A third site, Arb Gebeya in Gonder, closed because its rations were cut off by CRS. FHI plans to increase to 49,000 beneficiaries in Gayiant, bringing its total number of beneficiaries for Ethiopia to 110,000 per month. The emergency situation in Gayiant awraja will continue throughout 1986. An $800,000 operational support grant for S. Shewa sites expires March 11, but a proposal for another grant of $800,000 is awaiting obligation in AID/W. In addition to dry ration distributions, Title II commodities are being used in two wet feeding centers, and in food for work projects in both S. Shewa and Gonder. FHI intends to close its two wet feeding centers and change the dry ration distributions to food for work programs within the second Quarter of FY 1986.

Logistics: Title II commodities delivered to Assab are transported by Ketana trucks to Nazereth. From Nazereth, they are shipped via FHI's five long haul trucks to S. Shewa, FHI is looking into the possibility of using WTOE trucks from the port to Nazereth and to Gonder. The logistics for moving food to Gonder have not yet been firmly established, but WTOE trucks will presumably be used to ship food out of Assab.

Sponsor: International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).

AID/Addis Ababa proposed level: Beneficiaries: 731,125. Tonnage: 25,000 MT.

AID/Washington approvals to date:

[Dollars in thousands]

Commodities	Metric tons	Arrivals	Commodity	Ocean freight	Internal transport	Total
Flour	16,500	11,164				
Vegetable oil	1,850	1,850				
Lentils	1,575					
Total	19,925	13,014	$6,145.6	$2,888.9		$9,034.5

Program description: ICRC works in the contested zones of Eritrea, Tigre, Wello and Gonder. It also has a very small feeding program in Harerge. Its mandate is to work in areas affected by conflict. ICRC is reducing its program; because the conflict has abated in some areas, allowing other PVO's to operate where only ICRC could operate before, and also because of increased 1985 agricultural production. ICRC's number of beneficiaries is currently decreas-

ing, but is expected to increase again in April. Only one wet feeding center, at Adwa in Tigre, remains open. ICRC uses 15 kg per person as a full ration and 10 kg per person as a half ration per month. In addition to USG food, ICRC receives commodities from the EEC, Canada, Japan and West Germany.

Logistics: Title II commodities are received in Massawa or Assab, and are transported to distribution points by ICRC trucks. Distribution points currently have a two-to-three month buffer stock. Because of this buffer stock, ICRC does not anticipate making extensive use of the U.N. truck fleet, as it had earlier anticipated.

Sponsor: League of Red Cross Societies (LICROSS).

AID/Addis Ababa proposed level: Beneficiaries: 300,000. Tonnage: 10,000 MT.

AID/Washington approvals to date:

[Dollars in thousands]

Commodities	Metric tons	Arrivals	Commodity	Ocean freight	Internal transport	Total
Beans	330	330				
Flour	4,670	1,132				
Total	5,000	1,642	$1,347.6	$725.1	$291	$2,363.7

Program description: LICROSS is working on a large scale in the Kalu/Ambasel/Awsa area of Wello Region, as well as in northwestern Harerge and northern Sidamo (Wolaita). All LICROSS wet feeding centers have been closed since December, with the number of beneficiaries reduced from 300,000 to 217,000 and the ration substantially reduced from the 1985 level. Monthly dry rations of 10 kg flour, 1 kg beans and 1 kg oil are now being distributed in areas of poor harvest, and to nomadic pastoralists who had serious animal losses. By mid-1986, beneficiary numbers are expected to reach 300,000 again and ration size increased. A joint ERCS/LICROSS monitoring team conducts extensive nutrition, health and economic surveys of target areas.

Logistics: All aspects of the relief operation are managed jointly by the League and the Ethiopian Red Cross Society. ERCS currently has 16 long haul trucks. Daily reports are sent by radio from each distribution point and a consolidated report is presented at each monthly meeting. Maximum use is made of the program's potential to train Ethiopian Red Cross staff. LICROSS also receives food for its programs from the EEC, West Germany, England, Denmark and China.

Sponsor: Save the Children Federation, U.S.A.

AID/Addis Ababa proposed levels: Beneficiaries: 350,000. Tonnage: 20,000 MT.

AID/Washington approved to date:

[Dollars in thousands]

Commodities	Metric tons	Arrivals	Commodity	Ocean freight	Internal Transport	Total
Bulgur	7,388	7,403				
Wheat	5,875	5,924				
SFSG	492	488				
Vegetable oil	124	135				
NFDM	246					
Total	14,125	13,950	$2,607.4	$1,783.8	$932.6	$5,323.8

Program description: In an effort to curb migration of famine stricken people to the towns, SCF distributed dry rations to 168 kabeles in Yifat and Timuga awraja in Northern Shewa, reaching 354,000 beneficiaries by December of 1985. All distribution ceased in January as food was harvested. However, with only a 50 percent crop yield in Yifat and Timuga, emergency relief is expected to resume in March with beneficiary numbers reaching 350,000 by September. Rations will be 15 kg of wheat per person per month. Famine prevention projects such as tree nurseries, terracing and water catchments are planned by SCF, using food for work. SCF has vaccinated children in 175 kabeles of the awraja with a series of 6 inoculations and has a community health agent training program in cooperation with the Ministry of Health.

Logistics: All grain is delivered to Assab and transferred to SCF warehouses in Efeson, by its own fleet of 20 long haul trucks and distributed to centers by 10 short haul trucks. In October, SCF became an independent operating sponsor, having been logistically supported by CARE in FY 1985.

Sponsor: World Vision Relief Organization (WVRO).

AID/Addis Ababa proposed level: Beneficiaries: 230,000. Tonnage: 40,000 MT.

AID/Washington approved to date:

[Dollars in thousands]

Commodities	Metric tons	Arrivals	Commodity	Ocean freight	Internal transport	Totals
NFDM	6,130	3,081				
SFRO	260	160				
CSM	6,311	4,766				
Bulgur	23,662	13,063				
Atmite		345				
Vegetable oil	4,000	2,850				
Total	40,363	24,265	$10,279.6	$5,852.6	$3,227.5	$19,359.7

Program description: World Vision operates wet and dry ration emergency feeding centers (which it calls health-nutrition centers) in Ajibar, Alamata, Lalibela, Sanka and Sekota (Wello Region); Ibnet (Gondar Region); Ansokia and Omosheleko (Shewa Region); and Humbo (Sidamo Region). Wello, the most critical of the above regions, has 1.9 million people at risk; WVRO is reaching 95,000.

The center at Sekota started distributions in January; the center at Ibnet will be closing soon.

Last year, WVRO averaged 280,000 beneficiaries per month. The target for 1986 is 230,000 beneficiaries. A 2.8 million dollar operational support grant proposal is waiting obligation in AID/W. During 1985 WVRO succeeded in reducing the previously large populations at its H/N centers by providing agpaks as an incentive for farmers to return to their homes. Agpaks are again being provided this year, with AID funding.

The current standard dry ration is 15 kg of wheat per person per month, which replaces the wet feedings. Some rations are provided as food for work, e.g. general labor, (unloading trucks, camp maintenance, etc.). Over the year WVRO hopes this food for work will expand to development projects, such as irrigation, terracing and water catchment.

Logistics: WVRO has about 80 trucks operational. This is now overcoming a problem which has plagued the WVRO program throughout 1985—the unreliability of government transport. In addition, WVRO has constructed or rented from private sources enough warehousing space to accomodate over 80% of its needs.

Sponsor: World Vision Relief Organization (WVRO) Food for the North Initiative.

AID/Addis Ababa proposed level: Beneficiaries 100,000. Tonnage: 15,545 MT.

AID/Washington approved to date:

[Dollars in thousands]

Commodities	Metric tons	Arrivals	Commodity	Ocean freight	Internal transport	Total
Bulgur	9,964	13,646				
CSM	882	4,918				
Vegetable oil	1,203	3,287				
Total	12,049	21,131	$5,610.5	$2,921.7	$1,180	$9,712.2

Program description: To date, WVRO Food for the North program is operating only in Inde Selassie. From October to January it has distributed to an average of 12,479 beneficiaries per month, plus opened a maternal child health center, and assisted the Ministry of Health with personnel and medical supplies. The planned "Phase II" expansion of the program is in abeyance while WVRO conducts a needs assessment in Tigre (scheduled for completion on March 7). From this survey WVRO will decide where to expand in other areas of Tigre. The original plan was to distribute food in the following areas: Inde Selassie (100,000 beneficiaries); Wikro (50,000 beneficiaries); Maychew/Mehoni (50,000 beneficiaries); and Adigrat (40,000 beneficiaries).

Logistics: Title II commodities are received at the port of Massawa, and are moved by WVRO's trucks to the distribution points. James Beckley Associates, a private contractor, manages WVRO's Food for the North fleet of 40 trucks, which were partially funded by USAID. An operational support grant for $600,000 was obligated for the cost of logistics and administration.

FISCAL YEAR 1986 OPERATIONAL SUPPORT GRANT

Sponsor: LICROSS.
Amount: $2,844,168.
Date of Proposal: August, 1985.
Project Objectives: In order to reduce dependency on relief efforts and to encourage a return to agricultural self-sufficiency, LICROSS intends to provide improved seeds, agricultural implements (hand tools and ploughs), oxen, fertilizers and pesticides to 400,000 drought-affected people in southeastern Wello. This project will last for twelve months and will focus on returning recipients to their previous (pre-drought) agricultural lifestyle.
AID/ADDIS Endorsement: Addis 5599 dated September 25, 1985.
Current Status: State 306842 (dated October 5, 1985) states that the LICROSS proposal was favorably reviewed in AID/W and that an action memorandum would be signed the week of October 7. State 338598 (November 4) indicates that the grant agreement will be signed and pouched in AID/Addis as soon as the Congressional Notification has been cleared. AID/Addis awaits the signing and receipt of the grant agreement.
Sponsor: Partnership for productivity.
Amount: $292,852.
Date of proposal: August, 1985.
Date of effectiveness: November 6, 1985—November 5, 1986.
Program objectives: The grant, originally for the amount of $1,162,724, was to assist in providing seeds to drought-affected farmers. The grant was to fund $500,000 in local seed purchases, which was to be augmented a matching contribution of $250,000 to be obtained by PFP from private sources. The grant was also to provide two seed experts which were to (a) make assessments of seed needs and resources; (b) set up a system for local purchase and distribution (the latter through NGOs working in the seed deficit area); and (9c) provide NGOs and USAID with technical assistance on seed procurement and distribution plans. PFP planned to work under the auspices of the Christian Relief and Development Association (CRDA), as PFP itself is not registered in Ethiopia as an NGO.
AID/ADDIS endorsement: Addis Ababa 5358 of 9/10/85.
Current status: The two PFP seed consultants arrived in early November, 1986. However, the CRDA Executive Board decided not to allow PFP to affiliate with it, in part because this would violate CRDA's mandate as a non-operational, coordinating body. The RRC resisted PFP's request to affiliate with CRS instead. It did offer to register PFP as a funding organization, but such status would not allow PFP to have the needed oversight and control of the grant monies. In February, 1986, AID/Addis decided that further negotiation between PFP and RRC would be to no avail, as it was already too late for PFP to meet most of the objectives of the grant. AID and the NGOs had already finalized seed procurement and distribution plans without PFP's assistance. PFP agreed to terminate the grant. AID/W and PFP are in the process of closing out the grant. PFP's initial claim for its expenditures under the grant prior to its termination is $292,582.

Sponsor: World Food Program via UN Office for Emergency Operations in Africa.

Amount:

(OFDA)	$2,400,000
(Title II)	13,424,300
Total	15,824,300

Date of proposal: Not applicable.

Program objectives: This activity is part of a collaborative response by the USG, Band Aid/Live Aid and the UN/WFP to the inland transportation bottleneck that hampered the relief effort in 1985. AID has pledged 150 trucks or tractor-trailers and $2.4 million to establish and operate a consolidated UN fleet to move food aid in Northern Ethiopia. Band Aid has pledged 100 trucks and $1.3 million. The consolidated UN fleet will provide long haul service from the ports of Assab and Massawa to Wello, Tigray, Eritrea, Northern Shoa, and Eastern Gonder. The fleet is intended to move food beyond the primary warehouse centers of Kombolcha and Asmara to distribution points and secondary warehouses along main roads. These include points such as Maychew and Mekele that remained largely inaccessible by the road during most of 1985.

AID/ADDIS endorsement: This proposal grew directly from the Administrator's negotiations with the PMGSE and UN/ASG Kurt Jansson.

Current status: After lengthy negotiations, the RRC and WFP have signed an agreement establishing the UN fleet under control of a coordinating committee consisting of the RRC, Ministry of Transport, WFP, Band Aid and AID. WFP has established a Transport Operation in Ethiopia (WTOE) to operate the fleet. Forty-three Band Aid trucks have been delivered, of which 37 were put into operation on November 25 and 26. AID has leased 120 tractors, 150 semi trailers, 30 trucks and 50 truck trailers from the WVRO for its contribution to the fleet. Of these, 73 tractors, 113 semi trailers and 25 truck trailers have arrived at Assab between November 12 and 16 and should be commissioned shortly. The signing of a $2.4 million grant from AID for the maintenance and operation of the fleet has been delayed by negotiations within the coordinating committee on the UN fleet's tariff structure. A tenative agreement was reached on November 26. The signing of the $2.4 million grant is expected shortly.

APPENDIX III: STATISTICAL SUMMARY ON UNHCR PROGRAMS IN SUDAN—1985–86

UNITED NATIONS—HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES

BRANCH OFFICE FOR THE SUDAN

Note on refugees in the Sudan [1] (as at 1 April 1986)

1. There are now well over one million refugees in the Sudan of whom 617,500 are being assisted directly by UNHCR through the Office of the Sudanese Government's Commissioner for Refugees:

REFUGEES IN THE SUDAN

	Estimated refugee population [1]	Number assisted by UNHCR
From:		
Ethiopia	852,000	405,500
Chad	126,000	75,000
Uganda	250,000	129,500
Zaire	5,000	.....
Total	1,233,000	604,500

[1] Estimate of the Office of the Commissioner for Refugees, Government of Sudan.

Influx from Ethiopia into Eastern Sudan

2. At the beginning of 1984 there were already an estimated 500,000 refugees from Ethiopia in the Sudan, of whom 132,500 were in settlements assisted by UNHCR. Since then, the influx of over 300,000 new arrivals has tripled the number of Ethiopians receiving assistance under the UNHCR programme.

ESTABLISHED SETTLEMENTS

3. There are some 132,500 Ethiopians in 24 settlements established prior to 1984 (first influx in 1967). The majority of the settlements are agricultural; others are located where there is normally a demand for labour (the "wage-earning" settlements). By the beginning of 1984 all were at least partially self-sufficient. The almost total failure of the 1984 harvests in the agricultural settlements and the collapse of the rural labour market meant that, since late 1984, all required full food assistance. Selective additional feeding for the malnourished and vulnerable groups was also necessary. The general scarcity of food in 1985 in Eastern Sudan

[1] General information on UNHCR's activities in the Sudan is given in the UNHCR Fact Sheet. The purpose of this note is to provide up-to-date information on recent developments. Please see also the briefing note prepared by the Sudanese Office of the Commissioner for Refugees.

resulted in the movement to the settlements of some spontaneously settled refugees. The 1985 harvest was generally good in Eastern Sudan although there were areas of local crop failure. There have also been good wage-earning opportunities this agricultural season and in some settlements food aid can thus now be reduced.

SPONTANEOUSLY SETTLED

4. The majority of Ethiopian refugees who came to the Sudan before 1984 settled spontaneously in towns and villages; most of them have not received direct assistance. Their exact number is not known, but the Government estimates there to be a total of at least 180,000 in the major towns (Khartoum: 45,000; Gedaref: 35,000; Kassala: 50,000; Port Sudan: 50,000) and perhaps 200,000 in the smaller towns and rural communities in the Eastern and Central Regions.

5. These persons, like the Sudanese in the communities where they live, were also affected by the 1984 drought either directly as a result of successive harvest failures or indirectly because of the deteriorating economic situation, which resulted in the lack of normal employment opportunities and very high food prices (several times the 1983/84 prices for cereals) on the one hand, and low prices for livestock on the other. Some of these refugees moved to settlements or reception centres in search of food, as did some Sudanese. The distribution of food in Sudanese towns and villages to all those in need including spontaneously settled refugees was thus necessary, and programmes for this purpose were organized through WFP in the Red Sea Province and USAID with the assistance of CARE in Kassala Province. The situation of the spontaneously settled has now improved as a result of the good rains, better employment opportunities and the good harvest in most (but not all) of Kassala Province.

NEW ARRIVALS

6. Since the beginning of 1984 more than 300,000 persons have entered the Sudan from Ethiopia, primarily from Eritrea and Tigray. Statistics are given in Annex II. In the first half of 1984, some 20,000 new arrivals were assisted in the two new reception centres east of Gedaref (Wad el Hilewu and Um Rakoba), a previously established transit centre (Wad Sherife, close to Kassala) and the semi-urban centre of Tawawa (near Gedaref). The rate of influx of Eritreans began to increase in July 1984, and from December through April 1985 was at times as high as 1,000 persons per day. Most of the newly arrived Eritreans went to Wad Sherife. Since mid-February 85, some of these new arrivals have been transferred from there to other sites. During April 85 the influx into Wad Sherife was particularly large and is believed to have included many spontaneously settled Ethiopians. Many of these left the reception centre in early May, when some new arrivals began to be transferred to a new site near the Khashm-el Girba reservoir (Shagarab East 1). In recent months the population of Wad Sherife has again been increasing, with up to several hundred persons arriving daily from mid-August 85, reportedly as a result of security problems in their home areas. Over the last months the rate has de-

creased but 5 to 10 families continue to arrived daily. In addition to the influx into Kassala Province, over 20,000 semi-nomadic Eritreans, largely Beni Amer, entered South Tokar district in the Red Sea Province in 1985. There have also been arrivals in the southern part of Blue Nile Province and Malakal. Many of these persons have been transferred to reception centres in the Eastern region.

7. The large-scale influx from Tigray began at the end of October 84. By the end of December 84 some 40,000 persons had reached Tukl Baab (some 25 kms north-east of Kassala). They were subsequently moved to three sites in the Fau area adjacent to the Rahad Canal. Since December 1984, the main influx has been to the Wad Kowli area, where over 90,000 Tigrayans have arrived including 3,000 new arrivals at the end of August 84. Because Wad Kowli is not a satisfactory site with respect to access during the rains and water during the dry season, about 40,000 refugees were transferred from Wad Kowli to better sites (see paragraph 10). The rate of arrivals at Wad Kowli recently increased but there are, as yet, no indications that this is the start of a major new influx. Most newly arrived Tigrayans intend to rejoin their family and go back to their region of origin. In recent weeks there have been over one thousand new arrivals in the border regions of Blue Nile Province. The majority are Tigrayans.

SPONTANEOUS RETURN

8. In April and May 1985, large numbers of recent arrivals from Tigray province returned to their homes in order to prepare their fields and sow crops for the next harvest. Thousands returned to Ethiopia on foot from Wad Kowli, and in early May others began to make their way from the Hilat Hakuma and Fau reception centres through Wad Kowli to the border. By 30 June 1985 an estimated 55,000 persons had returned of their own accord to Tigray.

9. On 31 January 1986 Tigrayans started again to return home through Wad Kowli. To date 55,000 have departed. This spontaneous return movement is expected to continue through April. There has not been any significant recorded return home by Eritreans.

ASSISTANCE AND PRIORITY NEEDS

10. Sites: Several of the sites initially allocated for reception centres have presented serious problems with respect to water supply in the dry season and accessibility during the rains. For the accommodiation of new arrivals, a basic requirement has been the identification and preparation of more suitable sites with sufficient water and all-weather access. As such sites have been developed, refugees have been transferred to them from less satisfactory locations like Wad Kowli and Wad Sherife. About 40,000 refugees from Wad Kowli were transferred to new sites at Hilat Hakuma and at Shagarab, east of the Khashm-el-Girba lake. Some arrivals at Wad Sherife were moved to reception centres near the previously-established Khashm-el-Girba, Karkora and Kilo 26 settlements and to one of the Girba Lake sites (Shagarab East 1). Two new sites (Fau IV and Fau V) in Gezira Province (Central Region) near the Rahad canal have been prepared with the assistance of Swiss and German

government teams. Further transfers have been delayed because of health and other problems but are still expected to take place.

11. Food: The basic daily ration is 400 gm cereals; 60 gm pulses; 30 gm oil; 10 gm sugar. This provides approximately 1,900 kilo-calories. All refugees in the settlements established prior to 1984 and all new arrivals received this ration throughout most of 1985: some 200 mt of food per day. Because of the poor nutritional status of many new arrivals, the cereal ration was temporarily increased in the reception centres. In addition to the basic ration, supplementary feeding is provided to improve the nutritional status of those who are already malnourished and to protect those who are vulnerable. Supplementary feeding programme requirements are calculated on the basis of the following ration for each recipient: 20 gm dried skimmed milk (DSM); 100 gm corn soya milk (CSM); 35 gm sugar; 35 gm oil; 30 gm high protein biscuits. The actual ration varies according to the needs of the beneficiaries who now represent 7 to 15 percent of the population in the reception centres, and 3 to 8 percent in established settlements. Supplementary food needs represent an additional 20 mt of food per day. Food aid is now being reduced in some of the old settlements.

12. Food is provided through the World Food Programme (WFP) and contributions in kind to UNHCR from Governments, intergovernmental organizations such as the European Communities, and voluntary agencies. In addition, direct purchases have been made by UNHCR and, particularly for supplementary foods, by the Sudanese Commissioner for Refugees and NGOs. During January 1985, available stocks, local procurement and borrowing were insufficient to cover daily needs. As a result the nutritional status of many new arrivals deteriorated and mortality rates rose. Food, in particular high energy/density food for children, was airlifted to Kassala in January and February 1985. The general situation considerably improved as a result of a more assured supply of the basic ration and increased supplementary feeding. Difficulties in providing adequate amounts of vitamins and minerals in the ration have however continued to cause problems (see paragraph 15). Staple food needs for the rest of 1986 are to be partially met by local purchase, for which funds are being sought.

13. Water supply has been a serious problem. At Tukl Baab (now closed) and at Wad Sherife, there was insufficient water for the refugees who had arrived by December 1984; during the 1985 dry season Wad Kowli had a declining and deteriorating supply from the Atbara River. The situation has improved considerably, owing in part to the use of tanker trucks to haul water, but more still needs to be done to ensure an adequate supply of safe water. At Wad Sherife, where ground water is available, wells have been drilled on site by UNICEF and by a Dutch Government team, with the collaboration of OXFAM. Sufficient water is now trucked from these wells to distribution points in the reception centre, but recent influx have strained the distribution system. At Wad Kowli, water was trucked 28 kms from a pool in the bed of the Atbara. Since the onset of the rains in 1985 water has been drawn from the river near the reception centre. An infiltration gallery and purification tanks were built to improve water quality, but the level of water in the river is again falling. Despite action taken to retain surface

water in the river near the reception centre, it appears that water will again need to be trucked until the next rains.

14. Water supply problems were an important factor in the decision to transfer new arrivals to new sites. The sites near Fau, Hilat Hakuma and the Khashm-el-Girba lake rely at present on surface water pumped from the Rahad Canal, the Atbara and the lake respectively. A water pipeline from the Khashm-el-Girba lake to the Shagarab East sites was built with the assistance of a team from the Federal Republic of Germany (THW), which also installed water systems for Fau IV. At Um Rakoba, a Swedish Government team completed borewells that ensure an adequate water supply for the new reception centre. The improvement of water quality remains a priority wherever surface water sources are being used.

15. Health problems have resulted from the poor health condition and nutritional status of new arrivals, the lack of sufficient food and water, and inadequate sanitation and over crowding in many centres. In the early months, mortality rates, particularly of children, were high. Provision of adequate food and water has been the key to improving a very serious situation. Despite considerable improvements, selective feeding programmes are still needed for some of the children, including older children. There were serious outbreaks of measles and cases of meningitis; every effort is being made to ensure complete vaccination coverage of the vulnerable population, particularly the children. This is done at the health screening on arrival, when care is taken also to identify other communicable diseases, and through an EIP. Scurvy was found to be a problem in the reception centres owing to a lack of vitamin C in the diet. In the absence of local procurement of sufficient vitamin-rich foods, vitamins C and A are being imported and distributed with the basic ration.

16. In 1985, preparations were made to contend with outbreaks of cholera, which is present in the region. A buffer stock of the required medicaments, intravenous rehydration solution, oral rehydration salts and basic equipment was established and has been put to use in Wad Kowli, Shagarab East, Hilat Hakuma, Wad Sherife, Karkora and elsewhere as suspected outbreaks have occurred. As a result of the control measures, the case fatality rate was low. Hospital tents and additional supplies to replenish the buffer stock have been airlifted. Appropriate buffer stock supplies are being maintained.

17. Shelter must be provided for new arrivals. Permanent construction has not been considered appropriate. Local materials are being used where possible, but most new arrivals are being accommodated in tents provided by a number of donors, including in particular the European Communities.

18. Logistics: There is an all-weather road linking Port Sudan and Kartoum with the refugee-affected areas in Kassala Province. Local transport capacity exists but fuel has at times been unavailable, and UNHCR has therefore imported fuel directly to meet the needs of the programme. Access to some of the locations where refugees are situated (in particular, Um Rakoba, Wad El Hilewu, Hilat Hakuma and Wad Kowli) is difficult and many roads became impassable during the rains. Key access roads have been upgraded, particularly to Wad Sherife and Shagarab and a pedestrian bridge

across the Atbara has been constructed at Wad Kowli by a Swiss Government team. In September and October, a helicopter provided by the Norwegian Government was based at Showak and proved very useful. Regional storage capacity is available at present and prefabricated stores were provided for the reception sites, where buffer stocks of food supplies were stockpiled for the rains. The NGO CARE is assisting the Office of the Commissioner for Refugees and UNHCR with all aspects of logistics, including fuel supply.

Influx from Chad

19. The influx from Chad into Western Sudan (Darfur Region) began in mid-1984. Over 120,000 persons are thought to have entered the Sudan, though there have been few arrivals during recent months. Last year Chadians moved south or east in search of food and work in the same way as many Sudanese who were severely affected by the drought. Reception centres for Chadians have been established at Asernei, some 20 km north-east of El Geneina, on the west bank of the Wadi Kajja; Angikoti, some 150 km south of El Geneina and Umballa, 40 km north of Angikoti. Some 20,000 people, are receiving assistance in Asernei, including 1,200 Chadians transferred from El Geneina at the end of September 85. Several hundred new arrivals were registered in Asernei at the end of February. The Islamic African Relief Agency (IARA) is providing health care and sanitation services and assistance from OXFAM. The already existing difficulties of access to Asernei were aggravated when a key bridge was washed out in July 85 as a result of heavy rains but temporary repairs proved successful.

20. The 1985 rains, which started earlier than usual (mid-June), interrupted the move of refugees from Asernei to the more easily accessible site at Umballa, east of Wadi Azum. There are 27,000 refugees (including 6,000 moved from Asernei), registerd at Umballa where SCF (UK) and MSF (Belgium) provide services. There are some 23,000 Chadians registered at Angikota, including 6,000 Chadians moved there from the camp at Domai, outside Nyala. LICROSS is providing services at Angikoti but is expected to withdraw this month. It is expected the MSF (Belgium) will replace them. It is planned to establish small new centres with access to agricultural land near Habila and perhaps elsewhere. There are relatively good prospects for self-sufficiency for those Chadians who choose not to repatriate. To date there has been only a very limited recorded spontaneous return from spontaneously settled refugees. COR and UNHCR have offices at El Geneina and Nyala, the latter being the focal point for many relief activities in Darfur. The Islamic African Relief Agency (IARA) and World Vision assisted several thousand Chadians who made their way to the Central region.

21. Logistics to the West have proved extremely difficult. A serious shortfall in supplies occurred owing to problems in the rail link to Nyala and the blocking of the road link to El Geneina as a result of the rains. Attempts to establish a bufferstock of food at Asernei reception centre were unsuccessful, and during the 1985 rains the principal cereal supply for the camp was airlifted from Khartoum to El Geneina on the EEC sponsored air bridge. Road convoys are now regularly reaching El Geneina and adequate sup-

plies will be stock-piled before the next rainy season. The UNEOS WFP/Road Transport Organization (RTO) is helping with food transport. In several remote areas, needy Sudanese and Chadians received very little food during the rains, but the deployment of helicopters to the West for several months from mid-August through the U.S. Government allowed food delivery to previously inaccessible places, in particular the Beida area where there were several thousand Chadians; many of them severely malnourished. Assistance was provided to them through the League of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies and the Sudanese Red Crescent Society with medical support from Goal. In March 1986, 1,300 Chadian refugees were moved from Beida to Asernei. The other Chadians at Beida preferred to move elsewhere on their own and Beida has now been closed.

22. Food for refugees in Western Sudan has been supplied from the U.S. Government (USAID) sorghum donation to the Sudanese Government, from large donations from the EEC, the Federal Republic of Germany, and France. Food is also being supplied by WFP, supplemented by some local purchases by UNHCR. Save the Children Fund (UK) organises food logistics in Darfur for all persons in need outside the camps. In 1985, water resources were initially developed and improved under an agreement between COR, UNHCR and a Dutch technical assistance programme. OXFAM is now completing a water project aiming at provision of sufficient good quality water to all reception centres in Northern Darfur. There was an outbreak of suspected cholera at Angikoti, which was immediately controlled using medical bufferstocks prepositioned for this eventuality. Similar bufferstocks are in place in Asernei and Umballa where only isolated cases were recorded in 1985.

The South

23. The number of refugees in the 30 settlements on the West Bank and the 17 settlements on the East Bank in Equatoria Region is now some 90,000 and 34,000 respectively, of which many are becoming self-sufficient based on agricultural production. Some additional 125,000 Ugandans are thought to be spontaneously settled in Equatoria Region. Some 3,700 Ugandans were repatriated in 1985 in the framework of a limited voluntary repatriation movement. At the end of July, the repatriation was suspended pending clarification of the situation in Uganda. After July 1985, several thousand Ugandans returned spontaneously but, following the recent events in Uganda, at least 5,500 have come back to the Sudan. In addition 5,500 new arrivals have been registered and will benefit from UNHCR assistance. Fuel has been flown to Juba. Blankets, tents and drugs will be supplied to assist the new arrivals. The present insecurity in Southern Sudan has adversely affected the operations of UNHCR and the agencies implementing the assistance programme. There is a need for partial food assistance to both refugees and Sudanese in Equatoria as a result of grasshopper damage to the 1985 harvest.

ORGANIZATIONAL ARRANGEMENTS

24. To meet emergency needs, UNHCR considerably strengthened what was already one of its largest field establishments in the world. Offices in Port Sudan, Showak, Gedaref, El Geneina, Nyala, Juba and Yei are linked to Khartoum by radio. There are outposted field officers at the reception centres. (A list of international staff is given in Annex V.) The UNHCR Emergency Operation is closely co-ordinated with other components of the overall UN Emergency Operation in the Sudan.

25. UNHCR assistance to refugees in the Sudan is largely implemented by the Office of the Sudanese Commissioner for Refugees (COR), the focal point within the Government for all matters concerning refugees. Voluntary agencies (NGOs/PVOs) are also implementing parts of the programme, the majority with at least partial funding from UNHCR under tripartite agreements (NGO/COR/UNHCR). Substantial contributions have been made by NGOs from their own resources, notably Oxfam (UK) and SCF (UK). Voluntary agencies have assumed responsibility for most services in the health and supplementary feeding sectors. Government disaster corps and the League of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies are also active. (A list of these agencies and organizations is given in Annex VI.)

NEW UNHCR APPEALS AND FUNDING

26. Until November 1984 assistance to new arrivals was funded from within the UNHCR general programme. Since 8 November 1984, the High Commissioner has issued several appeals to the international community for emergency assistance, raising the target as the needs continued to increase. The most recent appeal was issued on 25 February 1986 and requests US$ 39.8 million for newly arrived Ethiopians in Eastern Sudan and US$ 12.1 million for Chadians in Western Sudan for the period through December 1986. Contributions to the appeals are summarized in Annex VII. The appeals are closely co-ordinated with those issued by the UN Office for Emergency Operations in Africa.

APPENDIX IV: CATHOLIC RELIEF SERVICES' REPORT ON ETHIOPIAN FOOD ASSESSMENT

CATHOLIC RELIEF SERVICES,
New York, NY, March 6, 1986.

DEAR SENATOR KENNEDY: The attached Executive Summary and the report from which it is derived, represents an independent assessment of 1986 emergency food needs in Ethiopia prepared by Intertect of Dallas, Texas. CRS contracted for the assessment to help determine emergency food needs, beneficiary targets and program implementation. However, the report's conclusions and recommendations are not necessarily those of CRS. Our comments to the attached are as follows:

(1) The "failure" to procure and distribute adequate seeds, tools, oxen, etc., for the meher rainy season crops cannot be laid wholly at the door of the relief agencies since suitable seeds were not easily available and a timely Ethiopian determination of needs and priorities was not forthcoming.

(2) It is unclear, given the transport now available, that additional trucks are needed at this time for the Northern Initiative.

(3) The accuracy of the suggested "modeling the population" as a means of monitoring the Northern Initiative is highly questionable. In addition to the unsettled conditions emanating from a civil war some of the population is nomadic and there is a considerable flow back and forth across the Sudanese border.

Finally, data regarding necessary emergency food assistance for 1986 are based in part on September 1985 AID statistics regarding carry-over for 1985 and anticipated 1986 commercial imports by the Government of Ethiopia. Should these be revised upward or downward expected emergency food needs would be correspondingly modified.

WILLIAM E. SCHAUFELE, Jr.,
Senior Director, Sub-Sahara Africa.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In December 1985, a three-person team from INTERTECT conducted an assessment of the food situation in Ethiopia and of the famine relief operations of Catholic Relief Services and its principal operating partners in Ethiopia. The findings of this mission are as follows:

1. The CRS program is effectively reaching approximately 2 million people per month. Despite early problems, the program has made a substantial impact on improving the health and nutritional status of those persons enrolled in the program.

2. While it is difficult to extrapolate nutritional data for the population in general (due to imprecise population figures and a lack of information about the nutritional status of persons not enrolled

in the program), it does appear that the program has had a significant impact on reducing mortality among the population in general and has contributed dramatically to reducing death rates throughout the areas served.

3. The famine conditions in the country have not substantially abated. In many cases, the zones of famine have shifted and new areas of need have developed. Despite one and a half years of intensive famine relief operations, substantial portions of the population of Ethiopia still remain at risk from famine, necessitating that extensive food relief operations continue for at least one more year. The reasons why food relief must be continued include:

(a) geographic shifts in the zones of famine;

(b) continued drought conditions in large areas of the country;

(c) a failure of relief agencies and the Government of Ethiopia to distribute adequate seeds in those areas where rains and climatic conditions would have permitted modest recovery in the recent meher (summer rains) season;

(d) continued fighting in the northern part of the country, principally Eritrea, Tigre and portions of Wello, which has continued to disrupt food production in those regions;

(e) failure of relief agencies to provide adequate agricultural inputs such as tools, oxen, etc., that would have increased harvests in those areas with normal or near normal conditions;

(f) disruptive agricultural programs carried out in certain portions of the country by the Government of Ethiopia, principally resettlement and a lack of financial incentives for agricultural recovery.

4. Many areas of the country are experiencing a "green famine", i.e., in areas where food production appears to be normal from visual observation, substantial food shortages are expected to occur. This is because:

(a) the amount of seeds planted in these areas is 20–40% less than normal;

(b) in some areas, seeds were planted late and were unable to take advantage of the full rainy season;

(c) in many areas, the meher rains ended early; thus, full maturing of the crops was not possible;

(d) in certain highland areas above 2,000 meters, frosts occured which partially damaged some of the standing crops;

(e) crop blights, insect infestations, grasshopper attacks, etc., have further reduced standing crops; and

(f) larger-than-average-sized families and high population densities in several of the food-producing regions create higher demands on the food per hectare than in other regions.

5. Approximately 1.3 million tons of food will be required for calendar year 1986 if all the food needs are to be met and extensive hunger is to be averted. This figure is based on:

(a) a nutrition-centered needs assessment;

(b) a structural deficit of approximately 700,000 tons of food;

(c) an estimated adjusted population of 40.2 million people;

(d) the capacity of the transport system and its ability to move the tonnages required.

6. While agreeing in principle with many of the assumptions of food needs assessments of both USAID and the Ethiopian Early Warning System, the INTERTECT team finds that food requirements are actually higher than both previous assessments. The tonnages are higher than the USAID assessment because:

(a) the rains, which were normal during the USAID assessment, ended shortly thereafter, reducing harvests throughout the meher regions;

(b) geographic shifts in the famine have threatened new segments of the population which were not counted in the USAID report;

(c) substantial populations, such as returnees from Somalia, were not included in USAID estimates.

Tonnages are higher than the Ethiopian EWS assessments because large segments of the population that should be eligible for food aid are omitted for "official" reasons; these populations include persons living in small towns, persons ineligible because of quota systems, and certain political populations such as the refugees returning from Somalia.

(The INTERTECT assessment does not include persons who are currently being resettled, either from their original homes or in their new settlements.)

7. Analysis of the nutritional data tends to indicate that persons receiving food from the CRS or counterpart programs are showing improvement in their nutritional status. Extensive mortality information, however, is not available on a region-by-region basis. Therefore, it is difficult to tell what impact the aid is having on the country as a whole. Data from other sources do indicate, however, that the programs have had a substantial impact on alleviating famine conditions throughout the regions in which the programs are operating.

8. After one year of famine relief operations, the implementing agencies have established a solid operational basis which should permit tightening the criteria under which persons or families are admitted to the food programs. By applying stricter criteria, and with closer monitoring, the food distribution programs can be "fine-tuned" and more accurate recipient targeting can take place. These adjustments will make it possible to enroll many persons who should qualify for food aid and discharge many of those families that have experienced agricultural, economic or nutritional recovery. Even with the fine-tuning however, it is not foreseen that the tonnages of food required on a nation-wide basis will be greatly affected, for those who are phased out can easily be replaced in equal number by those who should qualify and are not now enrolled.

9. In many areas, persons who have recovered (and in some cases persons who should have been ineligible) appear to have been kept on the rolls much longer than is necessary. It is felt that stricter admissions criteria can now be established and many recovered persons discharged so that others in need can be enrolled.

10. The Northern Initiative Program, while relatively new, does appear to be having the intended impact of providing food in the conflict areas. However, the program has proved difficult to monitor and the actual impact on reducing mortality cannot be evaluat-

ed at this time. The relative impact of the program can be seen by the fact that large numbers of people have not moved into towns seeking food. Conversely, many people who did move to relief centers in the towns have returned to their villages to receive food there. In addition, the numbers of people who were projected to flee to neighboring Sudan have been substantially downgraded and, at this writing, large numbers of those currently in Sudan appear ready to return to Ethiopia. It is felt that, in part, this is due to increased food availability, not only from agricultural recovery during the meher season, but also to availability of food from the Northern Initiative.

11. Closer monitoring of the Northern Initiative Program could be achieved by modeling the population, monitoring burials conducted by the priests currently monitoring the program, and extrapolating that information to the general population. Such modeling will be necessary to judge the effectiveness of the program and make adjustments in the coming year.

12. The nature of the relief operations has changed due, in part, to the efficiency of the food distribution program. However, the underlying conditions that cause famine have only changed slightly. In several areas, massive needs will be clearly discernible (especially in Harerge and Wello). However, in most cases, the famine will be characterized by "pockets of hunger" scattered throughout the country. These pockets will be more difficult to detect since they will occur in the villages and remote areas.

13. An analysis of the underlying causes of famine in Ethiopia shows that:

(a) the conditions that cause famine are still present in large sections of the country;

(b) famine interventions have thus far played only a minor part in alleviating the conditions that contribute to famine vulnerability; and

(c) if food aid were to be discontinued or substantially reduced in the coming year, widespread famine conditions could occur in a relatively short period of time.

Overall, the famine has tended to shift geographically, moving generally in a more southern and eastwardly direction. The same trend has been noted in past famines.

14. Approximately 1 million tons of food can be imported in 1986 to meet emergency food needs without having a negative impact on agricultural recovery. However, imports above this level mandate that much closer monitoring of food distribution take place at the local level to ensure that agricultural disincentives do not occur.

15. In 1985, food aid had the demonstrated effect of lowering food prices in most regions of the country, but prices were not lowered below a level at which they would have been a major disincentive to agricultural production. This was due, in part, to the fact that substantial areas of unmet needs existed prior to the time when large-scale food distribution was established on a continuous basis throughout the country. In 1986, it will be imperative to monitor food aid levels more closely since moderate agricultural recovery has occurred in many areas.

16. Food imports are reaching the level at which possible disincentives to agricultural production could happen if proper target-

ing of food distribution and close monitoring of real needs is not carried out.

17. Closer monitoring of food needs should permit agencies to adopt a variety of alternative food distribution strategies. These could include food-for-work, cash-for-work, grain-sharing, and food coupon programs.

Implementing agencies should consider using a mix of these projects to lessen the likelihood that food distribution could create disincentives to agricultural production or that long-term food distribution could create perceived dependencies among the population. It is especially important that food-for-work schemes be carefully planned not to coincide with food harvests, and that special attention be given to ensuring that food distributed in FFW projects reaches those most in need, especially women and small children.

18. Criteria for selecting alternative food distribution programs and projects must be developed and adjusted according to the situation in Ethiopia. Uniform criteria should be developed and observed by all agencies receiving food through the CRS food distribution network.

19. A food buffer stock strategy will be necessary in order to combat the changing nature of food needs for 1986. The recommended strategy is for the implementing agencies to develop small buffer stocks in the forward areas which could be reallocated to meet various contingencies if and when they arise. If the food is net needed, it can be distributed in the normal program the following year. Other buffer stock strategies do not appear to be feasible, given the current political climate.

20. Buffer stocks will be required to meet the following contingencies:

(a) The potential return of many non-refugee Ethiopians currently being fed in Somalia.

(b) Former refugees who have returned from Somalia, currently being fed under the auspices of the UNHCR.

(c) Persons who have been resettled.

(d) Pastoralists in various regions who may enter the food program unexpectedly due to shifts in the drought or famine.

21. It is estimated that the logistics system currently in operation has enough capacity to handle the necessary 1.38 million tons of food, if it arrives at an even pace throughout 1986. However, if food shipping delays occur or if purchasing is delayed, congestion could occur in the ports or in the primary distribution system. It should also be recognized that the conflict in the north could cause the GOE to temporarily reallocate government trucks or vehicles from the national fleet, which could reduce the total capacity available to the relief operations.

22. Some additional trucks are required to improve the distribution system at the local level. Trucks of 5–10 ton capacity are especially needed in the Northern Initiative Program.

23. While the chance of creating dependencies is a major concern to all operating agencies, the creation of real dependencies has not yet occurred.

24. In those areas where dry-ration food distribution will continue for another year, it is important to give long-term food recipi-

ents a chance to maintain a degree of dignity while receiving charity. It is recommended that the practice of voluntary contribution be reinstituted as one means of supporting this dignity.

25. If emergency needs arise, the available food can be stretched by utilizing several strategies to extend food aid. These include:

(a) improving the targeting of recipients and recipient communities;

(b) discharging healthy children from the food rolls after they have reached a normal weight-for-height range for 3 months;

(c) instituting a sliding scale for food distribution based on nutritional ratios for each individual case;

(d) reducing rations in areas showing major improvements in food production;

(e) reducing or halting food distribution immediately after the harvest period;

(f) reducing all rations by 5%;

(g) eliminating food-for-work programs and returning to strict dry-ration distribution; and

(h) gradually phasing down food in each individual area until a demonstrated impact on nutritional status is noted.

26. Increased attention should be given to small-scale, locally-based projects that can reduce famine vulnerability for the future.

27. A number of government policies and programs appear to have a disruptive effect on agricultural recovery. These include:

(a) restrictions on the movement of food from surplus areas to food-deficit areas (controlled in part by government regulation and government-controlled sales under the auspices of the Agricultural Marketing Corporation);

(b) absence of food price support for subsistence farmers; and

(c) forced resettlement.

Villagization, the government program of requiring peasants to move into small villages, does *not* appear to have had a substantial disruptive effect on agricultural production, nor has it resulted in a noticeable increase in production.

FOOD REQUIREMENTS AND AVAILABILITY LEVELS FOR ETHIOPIA



Line A-A' represents the national main food requirements for the 1986 Ethiopian population. Line B-B' represents the estimated actual average consumption of main foods for 1986. The gap between lines A-A' and B-B' represents the structural food deficit for 1986: 704,925 metric tons.

Line C-C' represents the total locally-produced foods available for consumption in Ethiopia in 1986, determined to be 5,422,665 metric tons. The gap between lines B-B' and C-C' represents the total food shortfall, that being the difference of normal average consumption of main foods and the total locally-produced available foods, equal to 1,815,408 metric tons.

The gap between lines B-B' and C-C' will be partially filled by food carry-over (218,000 metric tons), expected commercial imports (79,000 metric tons), and other food sources (132,000 metric tons), all totalling 429,000 metric tons. These food sources are represented by the gap between lines C-C' and D-D'.

The remaining gap between lines B-B' and D-D' represents the 1986 emergency food estimate of 1,386,408 metric tons.

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